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 Many experts predict that the global economy is headed toward a future wherein ‘data is the new oil.’ 
The agriculture and agri-food sector is no exception, considering that agricultural data—data generated to 
improve primary agricultural production—holds a great deal of valuable information about the global food 
supply, present and future. As digital hardware and software rapidly introgress agricultural production systems, 
an on-farm transformation in productivity and efficiency is creating the conditions for an impending value 
chain transformation driven by ag-data. Though still on the horizon, policymakers should pay close attention to 
how this future unfolds and consider the oncoming role of policy in promoting the ideal conditions for growth, 
innovation, and mutual benefit among stakeholders. 
 Policymakers must strive to understand more about a variety of questions, including what disruptive 
‘secondary uses’ of ag-data will be, who stands to win or lose, how much ag-data is worth, who will own it, and 
what ownership entails. One key issue is the rules and conditions under which ag-data will be exchanged. This 
thesis advances a behavioural approach to understanding the dynamics underlying an emerging market for ag-
data, especially assessing whether the initial assignment of ownership affects the valuation and end-distribution 
of benefits—i.e. whether there is an endowment effect present in the exchange of ag-data. A secondary analysis 
considered the impact of subjects’ worldviews within the same transactional environment. A cohort of 
agriculture students at the University of Saskatchewan (USask) were surveyed as a proxy for agricultural 
producers. The results indicate a strong endowment effect, suggesting the initial allocation of property rights 
over ag-data may strongly influence their end-distribution in a transactional market. This finding suggests that 
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 Many experts predict that the global economy is headed toward a future wherein ‘data is the new oil.1 
The agriculture and agri-food sector is no exception, considering that agricultural data (“ag-data”)—data 
generated to improve primary agricultural production—hold much valuable information about the current and 
future global food supply.2 As digital hardware and software rapidly introgress agricultural production systems, 
an on-farm transformation in productivity and efficiency is creating the conditions for an impending value chain 
transformation driven by ag-data. This transformation will occur as ag-data emanate from on-farm and 
permeate the broader agriculture and agri-food value chain to find new use-cases that generate new economic 
value.3 While the on-farm transformation benefits both producers and agribusinesses, the broader value chain 
transformation may deliver zero-sum outcomes whereby value migrates from producers to large 
agribusinesses.4 Though still on the horizon, policymakers should pay close attention to how this future unfolds 
and consider the role of policy in shaping the ideal conditions for economic growth, innovation, and mutual 
benefit among stakeholders.5 
 Today, the definite forms this value chain disruption will take and the stages of its unfolding remain 
unclear. Nevertheless, policymakers must confront these possibilities and strive to understand more about two 
overarching sets of questions. The first set concerns technology: how will various stakeholders leverage ag-data 
off-farm (i.e. new use-cases) and to what consequences (i.e. who wins and loses)? The second set concerns 
institutions: how can policy create institutions that maximize the benefits and minimize the detriments of ag-
data use across the agriculture and agri-food value chain? Developing better answers to each set of questions 
will empower policymakers to shape the conditions needed to better steer this digital transformation toward the 
public interest. This thesis confronts this challenge via a behavioural approach to modeling the outcomes of a 
transactional market for ag-data. 
 
1.2 THE POLICY PROBLEM 
 
 The focus of most scholarship on the digitization of agriculture and agri-food production has been 
limited to on-farm economic activity; thus, the implications of ag-data permeating the broader agri-food value 
chain (i.e. the off-farm transformation) remain underexplored. This is largely because most current ag-data use-
                                                   
1 “The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, but Data.” 
2 Wolfert et al., “Big Data in Smart Farming – A Review.” 
3 Mulla, “Twenty Five Years of Remote Sensing in Precision Agriculture.” 
4 Johnson, “Precision Agriculture.” 




cases consist in activities related to primary agricultural production (i.e. on-farm use-cases). However, as the 
global economy enters the Fourth Industrial Revolution and data become more portable and applicable to new 
use-cases, the impact of ag-data is unlikely to remain confined to on-farm economic activity—in fact, evidence 
suggests that the early stages of off-farm disruption are already underway, albeit in only a few discrete places so 
far. Studying these developments is challenging in that potential off-farm use-cases for ag-data are 
technologically underdeveloped (or, potentially, hidden to avoid regulatory scrutiny) while, institutionally, little 
structure exists to shape flows or adjudicate control of ag-data and its (current or future) use-cases. Such 
analytical challenges are inherent to the study of emerging technologies. 
 This thesis confronts these challenges. Without formal property rights in ag-data, de facto ownership 
(arising from advantages in technology, capital, and knowledge) has defaulted to the agribusinesses currently 
collecting, storing and controlling ag-data. As these agribusiness giants reposition for the future and develop 
strategies to leverage ag-data,6 policymakers must consider whether the status quo best serves the public 
interest and, if not, how formalizing property rights in ag-data might positively shape markets for ag-data such 
that agribusinesses and producers could participate in ways that would optimize the diffusion of this 
transformative technology.  
 The narrower question is whether such markets would allocate property rights in ag-data in ways that 
deliver efficient economic outcomes. Classical economics contends that, provided the minimal conditions for a 
free market, rational actors will bargain toward efficient outcomes, with the initial allocation of property rights 
impacting equity but not efficiency.7 However, a considerable body of evidence from the behavioural 
economics literature contends otherwise—namely that individuals (in this case, agricultural producers) rarely 
behave strictly rationally, often making decisions that undermine the efficiency of Coasian bargaining. This 
thesis examines the behavioural dynamics underlying a prospective market for ag-data, asking specifically 
whether initial endowment impacts the efficiency of distribution and—by extension—the value generated 
through its resulting use-cases. 
 In the broader value chain transformation of agriculture and agri-food production, ag-data has the 
potential to generate tremendous value both on-farm and, increasingly, through a plethora of off-farm use-cases. 
Answering behavioural questions regarding transactions should help policymakers decide whether (and how) 
intervention could shape effective ag-data markets. The correct institutional configuration would remain 
conducive to innovation and efficiency, promote greater trust and predictability, and allocate property rights 
such that ag-data drives positive-sum outcomes that benefit all stakeholders.8 
                                                   
6 Lowy, “Monsanto Is Bridging Genetics and Big Data Analytics”; Kanaracus, “Monsanto Bets Nearly $1 Billion on Big 
Data Analytics”; Manning, “What Is Ag Big Data? How 8 Companies Are Approaching It”; Roumeliotis and Burger, 
“Bayer Clinches Monsanto with Improved $66 Billion Bid.” 
7 Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost.” 




1.3 POLICY OBJECTIVES & THE PUBLIC INTEREST: A TALE OF TWO 
FUTURES 
 
 Disruption is the corollary of innovation in that technological change always produces winners and 
losers. Governing the digitization of food and emerging use-cases for ag-data will require institutions (both 
regulatory and proprietary) to align innovation with the public interest (i.e. maximize positive and limit adverse 
impacts). Where, inevitably, there are losers, policy must provide compensation to ensure a minimum 
acceptable degree of loss.9 The ‘public interest’ is a broad and subjective concept that balances considerations 
of growth vs. sustainability, innovation vs. competition, value creation vs. migration, economy vs. society, and 
efficiency vs. equity. Further, these sets of goals rarely present direct trade-offs, especially in the longer-term. In 
the context of Canadian agriculture and agri-food production, the primary goals are domestic food security, 
economic and export growth, innovation, and environmental sustainability—all of which are critical and highly 
interrelated. However, this thesis focusses more narrowly on balancing the goals of economic efficiency and 
equity (while aligning innovation with these goals). 
 When considering the eventual outcomes of innovation, it is helpful to imagine the end-point of several 
potential paths taken to their logical extremes. To that end, the digitization of agriculture and agri-food 
production could result in one of two hypothetical futures, one dystopian and the other utopian. The US chicken 
industry provides a cautionary tale for how monopoly and the centralization of control over data has 
concentrated the benefits of production and innovation in the hands of the oligopolistic firms that dominate the 
sector.10 Though this thesis is concerned exclusively with crop agriculture, the case of US poultry is relevant in 
that the two share several similarities. Parts of the crop agriculture value chain are similarly dominated (though 
to a lesser degree) by massive, vertically-integrated players such as DowDuPont, Syngenta AG, and Bayer 
(which acquired Monsanto in 201611) in biotech (seeds) and agrichemicals; Deere & Co. and CNH Industrial 
NV in farm equipment; and Cargill, Bunge, and Archer Daniel Midland in crop commodity trading and 
processing. The other vexing similarity is the precarious position of many producers, owing largely to 
environmental risk (e.g. drought and flooding amid increasing climate volatility) and economic uncertainty 
(e.g. unstable input and commodity prices) that threaten already-thin profit margins.  
 This thesis explores the justifiable concern that the increasingly centralized control (i.e. de facto 
ownership) over growing volumes of ag-data could enable monopolistic rent-seeking by agribusinesses that 
would further exacerbate producer vulnerability and result in economic marginalization similar to that observed 
in the US poultry industry. However, to the extent that off-farm use-cases for ag-data have yet to emerge, the 
current moment presents an ideal opportunity for proactive policy intervention. Before new norms become 
                                                   
9 Trebilcock, Dealing with Losers. 
10 Leonard, The Meat Racket. 




entrenched, policymakers have an opportunity to influence the conditions for inclusive growth and innovation. 
Despite signs portending a dystopian future, this thesis explores how institutions could, instead, steer the 
digitization of agriculture and agri-food toward one that looks considerably more utopian. Agriculture has long 
served as the base of many economies and formed the bedrock of communities, societies, and nations. In 1787, 
Thomas Jefferson wrote, “Agriculture is our wisest pursuit, because it will in the end contribute most to real 
wealth, good morals and happiness.”12 This vision still holds true today, but will now depend—perhaps more 
than ever, amid a digitizing global economy—on sound, enlightened, and timely policymaking. 
                                                   




CHAPTER II. THE DIGITIZATION OF AGRICULTURE 




 Most discourse on the digitization of agriculture and agri-food production has focussed on on-farm 
advancements in efficiency and productivity (i.e. precision agriculture), often evoking high-minded ambitions 
like the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization’s goal to increase food production by 60% to feed 
a projected 9-10 billion people by 2050.13 However, the truth is that this transformation has as much to do with 
profit motives as the food security goals championed in international development slogans. As the global 
economy enters the Fourth Industrial Revolution, no sector will remain untouched by the sweeping disruptions 
enabled by mass data generation, increased computational capacities, and the further integration of mechanical, 
digital, and biological systems.14 In today’s global economy, firms that most effectively use and control data 
reign, so much so that seven of today’s ten highest-valued global companies are data-driven technology firms.15 
There can be little doubt that agribusiness leaders are now acutely focused on their own opportunities to 
capitalize on the vast quantities of ag-data generated on-farm by their technologies. As the latest digital 
technologies introgress the agriculture and agri-food value chain, closer examination reveals that there is more 
than feeding the world at play. This section provides a descriptive background of this transformation. 
 
2.2 ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
 
 In 2017, the global agriculture and agri-food sector (including related supply and service activities) 
contributed USD$3.2 trillion to global gross domestic product (GDP) (3.8% of total)16 and employed 
approximately 1.3 billion people (roughly one third of the global workforce).17 Agriculture and agri-food 
production is a particularly important sector in Canada’s economy and Canada is a major player in the global 
agriculture and agri-food value chain. In 2016, the sector contributed $111.9 billion to total Canadian GDP 
(6.7% of total) and employed roughly 2.3 million people (12.5% of Canadian employment).18 Between 2012 
and 2016, GDP growth in the sector (11%) outpaced that of the broader Canadian economy (7.8%).19 In 2017, 
Canada recorded $110 billion in domestic agriculture and food processing sales.20 In primary agriculture, 2016 
                                                   
13 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, “Feeding Nine Billion in 2050.” 
14 Schwab, “The Fourth Industrial Revolution.” 
15 “How to Think about Data in 2019.” 
16 World Bank, “GDP (Current US$) | Data.” 
17 UNCTAD, “Investment Policy Hub.” 
18 Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, “An Overview of the Canadian Agriculture and Agri-Food System 2017.” 
19 Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada. 




saw farm market receipts reach a record high of $57.6 billion, the result of a 5.8% average yearly rate of growth 
between 1971 and 2016.21 Moreover, in 2017, Canada exported $56 billion in agriculture and agri-food 
products,22 and, as of 2016, Canada is the 5th largest global exporter of agricultural commodities ($24.6 billion; 
5.3% of global agricultural commodity exports); since 2014, Canada has been consistently the 11th largest 
global exporter of agricultural and agri-food products.23  
 
 
2.3 AGRICULTURE IN THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 
 
2.3.1 A Chain of Technological Revolutions 
 
 It is critical to situate the digitization of agriculture and agri-food production in the context of the 
broader Fourth Industrial Revolution, a defining feature of which is the digitization of all economic sectors. 
Whereas previous waves of agricultural innovation were limited mainly to mechanical and biological 
innovations, ag-data are now digitizing (i.e. digitally capturing and elucidating) vital processes and outcomes in 
primary agriculture and introgressing both mechanical (IoT) and biological (CRISPR, ‘the digital plant,’ etc.) 
technologies in the value chain. This deeper integration of mechanical, digital, and biological systems is a 
defining feature of the Fourth Industrial Revolution.24 
 This transformation is not occurring in a vacuum or through some exogenous set of developments; 
rather, the sector arrived at this point by a long chain of prior, interrelated technological and institutional 
transformations. Agricultural innovation has long held a central position in the global economy, advanced the 
welfare of society, and propelled the broader trajectory of innovation throughout economic history—directly 
and indirectly contributing to transformations far beyond the fields in which crops and animals are cultivated. 
This is largely because agriculture and food serve as base for all economies and societies. So sensitive is the 
global order to international flows of agricultural commodities, ingredients, and food products that even a short 
interruption in their production and trade would halt large segments of global economic activity and destabilize 
social order in many countries. Technological leaps in agriculture have worked to propel humanity forward, the 
earliest example being the development of crop cultivation in ancient Mesopotamia, considered by many to be 
the dawn of civilization.25 Long after, between 1500 and 1850 CE, the Second Agricultural Revolution (also 
known as the British Agricultural Revolution), involving techniques such as crop rotation, vastly increased land 
and labour productivity, emancipating much of Britain’s workforce from meagre agricultural subsistence. This 
                                                   
21 Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, “An Overview of the Canadian Agriculture and Agri-Food System 2017.” 
22 Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada. 
23 “FCC Ag Economics Trade Ranking Report: Agriculture.” 
24 Schwab, “The Fourth Industrial Revolution.” 




transformation freed up labour for other activities, a shift that was a necessary to the First Industrial Revolution 
and, by extension, all those that followed.26 
 Similarly, the Third Agricultural Revolution of the 1950s and 1960s enabled the productivity increases 
needed to supply enough food for the global population to reach today’s levels27 (currently above 7.5 billion28). 
Today, we are challenged to feed a projected 9-10 billion people by 2050;29 achieving this will require 
increasing global food production by between 60-100%, even as climate change reduces the supply of arable 
land and fresh water available for crop cultivation. Success will depend, in part, on fully leveraging ag-data 
across the broad agriculture and agri-food supply chain (i.e. the value chain transformation).30 While further 
digitization offers many of the best solutions to a complex array of challenges, this thesis explores how it also 
presents its own set of risks and, thus, opportunity for policy intervention. 
 
2.3.2 From the Third to the Fourth Industrial Revolution 
 
 The Third Industrial Revolution, beginning post-WWII, began a process of accelerated global 
digitization, escalating with the semiconductor revolution of the 1960s, followed by the personal computer in 
the 1970s, the development of digital networks in the 1980s, the rise of the contemporary internet (e.g. e-
commerce, search, and social media) in the 1990s and 2000s, and mobile and cloud computing in the last 
decade.31 Much as steam defined the First Industrial Revolution, data and information have come to define the 
Third and Fourth Industrial Revolutions.  
 However, what sets the Fourth revolution apart is a paradigm shift regarding data. Schonberger and 
Cukier hailed this shift in their seminal book entitled Big Data (published in 2014), which foretold this new 
technology “migrating to all areas of the human endeavor.” The authors pointed out that, just five years before 
the book’s release, ‘big data’—defined simply as “the ability of society to harness information in novel ways to 
produce useful insights or goods and services of significant value”—did not exist, nor could it have.32 In part, 
this is because providing the degree of computing power and storage necessary to analyse massive datasets had 
been infeasible (either technically or financially). However, the most critical ingredient was the shift in 
paradigm whereby raw data ceased to be “regarded as stale or static” to re-emerge as “a raw material of 
business [and] a vital economic input, used to create a new form of economic value.”33  
                                                   
26 Overton, “BBC - History - British History in Depth.” 
27 Hazell, The Asian Green Revolution. 
28 United States Census Bureau, “U.S. and World Population Clock.” 
29 Silva, “Feeding the World in 2050 and beyond – Part 1.” 
30 An et al., “Chapter 25 - Agriculture Cyber-Physical Systems.” 
31 “Welcome To The Unicorn Club.” 
32 Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, Big Data. 




 This new omnipresence of data extends the scope of tasks computers perform to a degree beyond what 
many, even recently, imagined possible.34 Each day, increasingly sophisticated algorithms transform the world 
of information and automate more and more cognitive processes (and at ever-greater speeds, thanks to Moore’s 
Law35), while robotics increasingly automate processes in the physical world. Today’s most-subscribed digital 
platforms (e.g. social media and search engines) track users online activities to extract value from 
understanding their behaviour; in these cases, data capture the ‘who, when, where, why, and how’ of people 
living their lives—or, as a recent Economist article put it: “Data is us.”36 However, increasingly, sensors also 
capture non-human operations in the physical economy, ‘datafying’ the core processes and outcomes of 
virtually all economic activity, including resource extraction and crop cultivation, design and manufacturing, 
transportation and storage, trade, as well as all online commercial activity.37 As they are aggregated into 
massive, diverse, and dynamically expanding datasets, these data are rapidly finding new applications, 
especially as analytics tools and techniques improve and firms integrate real-time data into existing industrial 
systems and decision-making processes.38 Moreover, increasing interoperability (i.e. data integration through 
APIs) will further extend the applicability of datasets to new use-cases.  
 The view that “data is the new oil” garners consensus as many of today’s firms invest intensively in 
their capacity to collect, store, analyze, and leverage massive datasets.39 As more firms compete to adopt, 
integrate, and develop new hardware and software, and to automate and digitize a wider range of core business 
processes, the competitive goalposts are continually moving—particularly amid continuing forces of 
globalization.40 Critically, digitization is driving massive economic growth: The World Economic Forum 
estimated that in 2014, the digital economy contributed $2.8 trillion to global GDP and claimed that “cross-
border dataflows now generate more economic value than traditional flows of traded goods.”41 McKinsey 
Global Institute estimated that by 2025, this increased cyber-physical integration of economic systems will 
generate over US$125 trillion in gross value42 (for perspective, the World Bank estimated Gross World Product 
in 2016 at $76 trillion);43 AgFunder reports that agtech investment activity globally accelerated dramatically 
between 2012 and 2018, totalling US$ 55.5 B over the period and US$16.9 B in 2018 alone.44 
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2.4 PRECISION AGRICULTURE (THE ON-FARM TRANSFORMATION) 
 
 Amid this process of mass digitization, many observers have overlooked innovations in agriculture and 
agri-food production, despite its long history at the forefront of technology adoption (recently and most visibly, 
autonomous vehicles45). Advances in digital technology over the last decade have revolutionized primary 
production46 and most digital innovation in agriculture has, so far, occurred on-farm. Even as ag-data permeate 
the broader value chain, the locus of digitization will remain on-farm in that ag-data originate on-farm, digitally 
capture on-farm processes and outcomes, and enable on-farm use-cases that improve primary (i.e. on-farm) 
agricultural production.  
 The Green Revolution of the 1960s47 was followed by vast improvements to machinery and the 
implementation of superior management practices.48 Meanwhile, much of Asia, Africa and Latin American 
remain, to this day, largely “untouched by modern technology.”49 The hallmark of ‘precision agriculture’ is the 
digitization of primary production towards a future of increased automation and precision (i.e. more efficient 
utilization and placement of inputs), which is expected to both contribute to feeding the growing global 
population and help sustainably manage resources amid a warming global climate; agriculture currently uses 
roughly “55% of non-forest land, 80% of total freshwater, and 30% of fossil fuels” consumed globally each 
year.50 
 
2.4.1 GPS/GIS Guidance 
 
 The earliest developments in precision agriculture date back to the 1980s with the application of global 
positioning system (GPS) and global information system (GIS) technology to farm machinery (i.e. tractors, 
combines, sprayers and seeders, etc.).51 As consistently straight field rows had long been a hallmark of quality 
farming, the initial objective of precision agriculture was to automate steering for greater precision. Over the 
past 25 years and since the advent of these innovations, mass adoption has also all but eliminated human error 
from steering in seeding, spraying, and harvesting processes. Autosteer also frees up producers to attend to 
other tasks while significantly cutting down on the wastes associated with overlap (i.e. applying seeds or other 
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inputs in the same area more than once).52 Today, most producers in the developed world have adopted 
GPS/GIS-guidance.53 Moving into the future, the logical extension of this technology is fully-autonomous farm 
machinery; in spring 2018, the launch of SeedMaster’s autonomous Dot Power Platform marked the first 
commercial deployment of this technology in agriculture.54 
 
2.4.2 Sectional Control 
 
 Concurrent with this trend toward greater automation, a technology called sectional control (also called 
‘swath control’) represents a further degree of precision in ag-production. Equipping to both sprayers and 
seeders, sectional control leverages GPS/GIS to automatically disable individual seeder rows or sprayer nozzles 
when a vehicle runs outside a set boundary or passes over land that has already been seeded, fertilized, or 
sprayed.55 This capability is particularly useful when dealing with irregularly shaped areas and when navigating 
headlands (i.e. the parameters of a planted field). Sectional control presents a clear value proposition that 
focusses on saving producers a great deal in costs for seed, fertilizer, pesticides, and herbicides, while also 




 While GPS/GIS technology is the foundation of precision agriculture, it is the recent decision of ag-
manufacturers to embed sensors in nearly every newly-manufactured tractor, combine, sprayer and seeder that 
has truly set the stage for an on-farm and (particularly) off-farm value chain transformation driven by ag-data.57 
This shift was enabled by recent reductions in the cost of sensors as well as ID-related advancements in 
computing.58 However, the sudden ubiquity of sensors in ag-machinery is likely also a testament to the 
(speculative) off-farm value of ag-data, which contains valuable information (i.e. soil, climate, seed, input and 
application decisions, and yield) that could help predict the quantities and qualities of the future global food 
supply across various geographies.59  
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 This flood of sensors into new ag-equipment has also come in the form of unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs),60 which collect infrared, multispectral, or thermal infrared images that are digitally rendered to 
produce actionable assessments of crop health, elevation, and input distribution.61 Farm management software 
analyzes, reorganizes, and stylizes these data to provide “accurate 2D orthomosaic [and] 3D models” from 
which producers can empirically assess how parameter adjustments may have led to positive or negative 
outcomes.62 Today’s vast array of sensor-based technologies, often used in concert, represent a further degree 
of intensification in precision agriculture, but also—just as importantly—the entrance of agriculture into the so-
called data economy through the generation of ag-data. 
 
2.4.4 Variable Rate Technology (VRT) 
 
 Though “farming has been empirically driven for over a century,”63 a new degree of data-driven 
precision is bringing the science of agronomy closer than ever to the praxis of daily farming. Theoretically, 
sufficient ag-data are now available to augment decision-making to the extent that ‘satisficing’ need not remain 
the modus operandi for most decision-making processes in ag-production processes. However, in practice, 
many challenges remain. So far, these data and the processes whereby they are used appear to be a compliment 
rather than substitute for human-decision making, empowering producers to make better-informed decisions, in 
real time, based on statistically-significant datasets. 
 Finally, variable-rate technology (VRT) represents yet a further degree of intensification in precision 
agriculture. VRT translates ag-data into digital prescriptions that control seed metering and spraying rates to 
match input application in real time to the agronomic needs of unique field locations. Based on geographical 
location, VRT-enabled equipment varies input application rates by shutting on and off individual components 
as necessary.64 Application prescriptions are ultimately determined by the agronomic information 
corresponding to precise locations, including soil health, elevation, and NDVI maps of vegetative health.65 
VRT also enables seeders and sprayers to navigate more challenging topographies by varying application rates 
to match elevation-based growth capacity.66 
 Today, VRT adoption remains slow due mainly to the high costs and the steep learning curve 
associated with the technology. For many, the cumulative fixed cost for a wide array of complementary 
precision ag technologies is prohibitive, especially considering a range of persistent risks (e.g. weather, pests, 
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disease) that threaten to undermine these investments. Many producers also face financial constraints and 
tightening margins as competitors pursue greater economies of scale by adding acres to their operation.67 This 
drive to consolidation has pushed many small- and medium-sized producers out of the market and left many of 
the rest tenuously holding on (one expert opined that the minimum viable size for a Canadian farming operation 
is approaching 3000-4000 acres68). Despite this financial drag on adoption among small- and medium-sized 
producers,69 experts predict an uptick in VRT adoption as early adopters work out kinks in the technology and 
realize significant returns on investment, thereby validating the technology for later adaptors. As this thesis will 
explore, the role of policy in increasing producers’ trust through clarifying ag-data ownership will likely be 
critical to driving greater adoption of precision agriculture technologies.70 
 
2.4.5 Smartphones (Internet of Things) 
 
 Last, the smartphone has become increasingly central to precision agriculture systems.71 Sensors have 
enabled agribusinesses to offer many new hardware devices that, among other functions, monitor key 
production parameters (e.g. the volume, heat and moisture of stored commodities; irrigation cycles). 
Smartphones serve as a universal remote-control device to monitor and operate a range of agricultural 
productions systems.72 The network of interconnected digital devices that continually collect, process, and 
transmit this data exemplifies the ‘Internet of Things’— defined as a network of devices that are physically 
distributed but digitally interconnected.73 
 All the aforementioned technologies embody the ‘precision agriculture’ concept. This brief overview 
barely scratched the surface of a bounty of innovations introduced to overcome current issues in ag-production. 
These new digitally-driven on-farm processes generate tremendous volumes of ag-data, in turn, creating the 
potential for a broader value chain transformation. Though the on-farm transformation is locus of digital 
transformation, the eventual impact of ag-data permeating the broader supply chain may far exceed that of 
precision agriculture as ag-data migrates to food processing facilities, financial institutions, R&D projects, 
blockchains, and anywhere else new value could potentially be realized. 
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CHAPTER III. AG-DATA AND THE “VALUE CHAIN 
TRANSFORMATION” 
 
3.1 THE “VALUE CHAIN TRANSFORMATION” OF AGRICULTURE AND AGRI-
FOOD 
 
3.1.1 The Value Proposition for Agribusiness 
 
 As precision agriculture moves toward widespread adoption, agribusinesses stand to profit 
considerably from establishing a new catalogue of data-driven products and services that further automate and 
improve the efficiency of agricultural production. However, this thesis focusses on how the on-farm 
transformation (i.e. precision agriculture) is creating the conditions for a broader value chain transformation 
driven by ag-data. The ongoing digital transformation of all major sectors, including business, finance, and 
healthcare,74 has fixed the gaze of leaders in every industry on the ‘big data future’—i.e. the untapped value of 
insights from analysing troves of diverse, aggregated data.75 Though they have yet to fully implement strategies 
to leverage ag-data, leaders in agribusiness are betting on the same future.  
 Each day, several thousand farms across the developed world collect vast quantities of data that capture 
yield, moisture, climate, soil and input application, and many other features in ag-production.76 This highly 
valuable information could answer several important commercial questions, including how current commodity 
and product supplies could better meet the demands of consumers at various locations, the quality of nutrition 
available to billions of people, and the value (i.e. price) of commodities, ingredients, and food at various stages 
of their manufacture and trade. Leveraging ag-data to more effectively answer these (and other) questions 
presents a massive opportunity for agribusinesses to capture new and existing value. Though it is too early to 
tell, profits from off-farm use-cases for ag-data could eventually outstrip those from selling precision 
agriculture products.  
 Many experts acknowledge that that “to date only a small portion of [ag-data] is being used and shared 
with partners such as advisors, suppliers, buyers, consumers and government.”77 Nevertheless, many also 
foresee that, as technologies progress and volumes of ag-data expand,78 so too will opportunities to commodify 
and leverage it. Many forms of data already play “the role of an oracle providing insight on seasonal 
activities…informing insurance policies, finance facilities, and commodity exchanges,”79 so integrating ag-data 
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appears an intuitive proposition. Precision agriculture provider Farmobile claims, “We have data buyers calling 
us like crazy…[f]rom reinsurance companies to technology giants to chemical and seed companies,” all 
“hungry for a consistent stream of high-quality, layered, ground-truth farm data.”80 Perhaps the best illustration 
of the ag-data opportunity came from agricultural lawyer (and ag-data thought leader) Todd Janzen in his 
November 2017 testimony to the US Senate’s Subcommittee on Consumer Protection, Product Safety, 
Insurance and Data Security: 
“This marks the first time in history that the majority of the information that farmers generate 
and use on their farms has been moved into the hands of companies outside the farm. As a result, 
we are seeing a digital land-rush occurring across the United States. The past few years have 
seen millions of dollars pour into ag data startups from Silicon Valley, to Kansas City, to North 
Carolina. Historic legacy agricultural companies, such as John Deere, are also at the forefront of 
this movement by expanding their product offerings to include cloud-based data storage 
platforms. All of these companies are scrambling to get the most acres of data into their platforms 
so that when consolidation of ag technology providers (ATPs) begins, they are in the strongest 
position. In the race to the cloud, we must also be cautious so that the American farmer is not left 
behind.”81 
 
3.1.2 What Does ‘Big Data’ Look Like in Agriculture and Agri-Food Production? 
 
 As more commentators discuss the ‘big data’ revolution in agriculture, the term bears closer 
examination. Ellixson and Griffin define big data in this context as “aggregated farm data gathered from 
numerous farming operations into a single database or repository,” effectively “combining each farmer’s data 
across a geographic region.”82 The notion of ‘big data’ can be nebulous in that scale is its defining feature: the 
label applies only where a certain volume threshold is satisfied, whereupon a “change in scale” (i.e. a 
quantitative change) begets a “change in state” (i.e. a qualitative change).83  
 Not all on-farm use-cases for ag-data satisfy this threshold. For example, in precision agriculture, 
sensors embedded in machinery and UAVs on a farm may collect data only about the conditions of that farm to 
harness precision agriculture capabilities that intensify productive capacity of that farm. Leveraging 
individualized ag-data may not meet the ‘big data’ threshold in that few individual farms are ‘big’ enough to 
solely generate sufficient volumes of data.84 The term is more appropriate to on-farm use-cases involving 
aggregated datasets generated across many farms (e.g. for benchmarking or universal prescriptions). Similarly, 
not all potential off-farm use-cases entail aggregating ag-data at the regional, national or international level; 
however, those that do may come to embody the connotations of big data to the greatest extend yet. 
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 The functions of big data are highly intertwined with other digital technologies considered vis-à-vis ag-
data, such as artificial intelligence and machine learning, cloud computing, IoT, and, in some cases, blockchain. 
In fact, the promise of big data may hinge on integrating these other technologies, as evidenced in John Deere’s 
acquisition of Blue River Technologies, an event many considered a harbinger for “machine learning and 
artificial intelligence” moving “from a concept to real [use-cases] on the farm.”85  
 As agribusinesses, through various network and partnership, aggregate and successfully leverage more 
and more ag-data, so grows the need for policy to shape these data flows and—most importantly—to define 
who controls and benefits from them. In the open data literature, de Beer notes that “formal legal frameworks 
become most important…when open data initiatives are scaled up” in that “scalability is the fulcrum on which 
the balance between formal and informal governance of open data pivots,” whereupon “clear legal rules then 
become integral to delineate the scope of data ownership and promotion of openness.”86  
 
3.1.3 The Agriculture and Agri-Food Value Chain and Technologies 
 
Visualizing the agriculture and agri-food value chain is helpful in considering off-farm use-cases and their 
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Figure 3.1: Agriculture and Agri-Food Value Chain 
‘Upstream’ refers to the agribusinesses that provide the (non-land) inputs to primary agricultural production:  
• Conventional and biotechnology companies (i.e. seeds and genetics); 
• agrichemicals (i.e. fertilizer, herbicides, pesticides, and fungicides); and 
• agricultural equipment providers (i.e. machinery, hardware, and software).  
Critical ‘downstream’ actors include agricultural: 
• commodity handlers, who receive, purchase, and transport raw agricultural commodities; 
• processors of ingredients and food products; 
• actors involved in the transport and trade of food products for final retail and distribution; and 
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• food and beverage retailers, who distribute final food and beverage products to consumers.  
 
Currently, upstream actors (i.e. biotechnology, agrichemical, and equipment) comprise the majority of 
agricultural technology providers (ATPs) supplying the precision agriculture products producers use generate 
and leverage ag-data on-farm. As a result, in the early stages of the ‘digital land-rush,’ upstream players are in 
the best position to control ag-data flows and have the largest stake in developing new use-cases. As with 
precision agriculture, many new use-cases could drive positive-sum growth and benefit producers and ATPs 
alike (often called value creation); alternatively, some new value chain applications for ag-data could drive 
zero-sum outcomes by enabling agribusinesses to capture value at the expense of producers (sometimes called 
value migration). Interestingly, many of the potential risks to producers lie in downstream use-cases, 
particularly those concerning commodity markets. This raises questions about if and where upstream ATPs 
(who currently control ag-data flows) see opportunity in downstream ag-data use—whether they are targeting 
their efforts on expanding their operations downstream or by selling ag-data to established downstream players 
(e.g. commodity handlers or commodity futures traders). 
 In any case, as ag-data migrates downstream—whether via an open or transactional model—
incumbents in these spaces will likely join the ‘digital land-rush,’ striving to grow their presence and vie for 
more control over ag-data flows. Policymakers should closely track the development of off-farm use-cases with 
a view to the forming institutions to structure increasingly complex, multilateral data flows between 
agribusinesses across the value chain. This is the developing context this thesis examines. 
 
3.2 AG-DATA USE-CASES: PRIMARY, SECONDARY & TERTIARY USE 
 
 While all development in the value chain transformation remains ostensibly nascent, early signals 
point to several potential use-cases. These cases vary both in where they reside in the value chain (i.e. upstream 
or downstream) and their potential impact on agricultural producers (i.e. positive, negative, or neutral).  
 By definition, the inherent purpose of agribusiness has been to provide the products and services 
producers need to maximize productivity and efficiency in in primary production. Consistent with this logic is 
the individualized, on-farm use of ag-data by producers toward positive-sum outcomes whereby producers and 
agribusinesses each benefit. The term primary use refers to all positive-sum use-cases that benefit both 
agribusinesses and producers (whether on- or off-farm). Though precision agriculture is the central primary 
use-case for ag-data, there may be several positive-sum off-farm use-cases relating to activities such as targeted 
marketing of agricultural inputs, product innovation, supply chain and logistics management, risk mitigation, 
and improved traceability in commodities. All are ostensibly net-positive for producers, even if agribusinesses 




 The need for policy intervention would be less pressing were all ag-data use-cases positive-sum; reality 
presents a less sanguine future. For policymakers, the most critical area for oversight may be potential use-
cases that leverage ag-data toward less favourable ends such as commodity speculation, anticompetitive 
practices, and other activities that erode privacy, concentrate market power, deepen information asymmetry, or 
generally promote zero- or negative-sum outcomes—i.e. where agribusinesses profit not by creating new value 
but extracting value by eating at the margins of producers (i.e. rent-seeking). Therein lies the greatest potential 
for market failure and where the digitization of food systems risks undermining the public interest. The term 
secondary use will refer to potential zero-sum use-cases that create little or no new value, instead transferring 
value from producers to one or more agribusinesses. To safeguard the interests of producers and the broader 
public, policymakers must beware and arrest the formation of institutions that would promote secondary use. 
 Last, the term tertiary use will refer to positive-sum use-cases whose benefits accrue to agribusinesses 
but leave producers no worse off. Likely candidates include targeted marketing of inputs, supply chain and 
logistics management, and risk mitigation for agribusinesses. In these early days, the line between primary and 
tertiary cases is far from definite; given that agribusinesses and producers likely stand to benefit from many of 
the same positive-sum use-cases (if not always equally), the distinction between primary and tertiary use, then, 
lies in to degree to which producers share in the new value created.  
 While it remains unclear which use-cases will emerge, sufficient information is available to 
contextualize these use-cases within a broader framework. Figure 2 depicts several potential use-cases, both on-
farm and off-farm, for each of the three categories. 
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Figure 3.2: Primary, Secondary & Tertiary Use-Cases 
 It bears noting that impact (i.e. distribution of benefits and risks) is the organizing principle of this 
analytical framework, which aims to make out the lineaments of a picture still blurred by insufficient 
information, transparency, and—ultimately—technological development. It is early days yet, so each potential 
use-case and its impacts remain somewhat uncertain; nevertheless, proactive policymaking demands attention 
and consideration to each. This framework helps move toward a clearer policy goal. Chapter VIII applies these 








 Previous chapters described the early stages of digitization in agriculture and agri-food production, 
tracing a line from precision agriculture to the potential off-farm use-cases that will define its broader value 
chain transformation. Chapter III offered a model for thinking about these use-cases in terms of their likely 
impact on producers. This chapter examines the institutional status quo and considers governance options to 
promote positive-sum and limit negative-sum use-cases for ag-data. However, studying an economic space in 
flux presents a ‘meta-policy problem’—that of defining a problem within an environment whose parameters 
remain unclear, indeterminate, impermanent, or unknown. Despite these analytical challenges, policymakers 
must envision, in broad strokes, a plausible trajectory for things to come. Though it is impossible to assemble a 
complete picture—much less a set of attending policy prescriptions—sufficient information exists to engage 
this puzzle toward an outcome in the public interest. 
 
4.2 TECHNOLOGY, INSTITUTIONS, INNOVATION & DISRUPTION 
 
 Commerce exists to fulfil human needs (i.e. demand) and the study of economics concerns the 
allocation of the scarce resources that meet those needs (e.g. nutrition, shelter, security, energy, mobility, 
healthcare, information). While the human needs driving economic activity remain mostly the same, the tools 
and processes industries use to satisfy them are changing rapidly through digitization. Hardware, software, and 
data are set to play a larger role in the processes that define all sectors and industries. Economics is also 
concerned with technological change and its implications vis-à-vis economic objectives. Economic potential is 
defined within the limits set by two dynamic boundaries: technology and institutions. Technology concerns 
what is possible/feasible in the physical world, while institutions exist in the space of shared human 
consciousness, determining both what is possible and what is permitted in terms of human organization toward 
commercial ends. Innovation sits at the intersection of technology and institutions, occurring when institutional 




 Technology is an ever-shifting line demarcating the limits of possibility in the physical world (and, 
thus commercial and economic spaces), the bounds of which are continuously giving way to scientific and 
technological progress. Ideally, new ideas, discoveries, and technologies develop (often through R&D efforts) 
within or diffuse into new economic spaces, commercializing in the form of new products and processes that 




solve economic, environmental, and social problems, and maximize societal utility. Technological progress 
occurs in successive, overlapping layers of new, fundamental technologies (i.e. diffusion), each one finding a 
multitude of applications and use-cases in various economic and social spaces. As technologies diffuse, use-
cases divide and multiply, akin to cellular division, as industries and firms adopt superior technologies and 
practices and abandon inferior ones. In each economic space, unique incentives drive adoption in waves—from 
early- to mid- to late-adoption of a given technology. Each successive wave of diffusion is pregnant with the 




 Institutions are the second ever-shifting boundary determining the universe of possibility in economic 
space. Institutions can be both formal-codified (e.g. laws, public and corporate policies) and informal-
conventional (e.g. societal morals, commercial structures, business models). Both formal and informal 
institutions define the creative tension that, at once, constrains (e.g. regulations, corporate law) and enables 
(e.g. property rights, intellectual property) economic activity. Thus, institutions shape both what is permitted by 
law (i.e. formal) and what is possible in terms of commercial organization (i.e. commercial networks), working 
together to structure economic activity (e.g. the production and distribution of goods and services as well as 
flows of information and capital). Institutions, both formal and informal, also respond (i.e. adaptation) to 
technological changes, which are, themselves, the result of prior institutional efforts (i.e. innovation). 
 
4.2.3 Innovation & Disruption 
 
 Innovation exists at the intersection of technology and institutions, occurring when the necessary 
alignment of commercial, economic, legal, and social institutions creates the conditions to realize technological 
progress. Thus, technological progress hinges not only on advancing the knowledge frontier, but also on social 
organization to move ideas to commercialization and eventual widespread adoption, thereby changing 
transforming economic and social spaces while, in turn, forcing other institutions to adapt. The goal of 
innovation policy is to foster the conditions necessary to enable technological progress while, at the same time, 
ensuring that other institutions can adapt successfully, leaving society as a whole better off. 
 As captured in Schumpeter’s notion of ‘creative destruction,’87 disruption is the corollary of innovation 
in that economic change inevitably produces winners and losers. Disruption entails value migrating along 
industrial, locational, and sapien dimensions, often creating the need for policy intervention, whether by 
imposing rules (i.e. regulation), redirecting capital (i.e. taxation and investment in public goods), or reshaping 
structures of control (i.e. property rights) to better align technological change with the public interest. 
                                                   




4.3 OVERCOMING TECHNOLOGICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL UNCERTAINTY 
 
 This theoretical underpinning helps frame a policy problem by unpacking the value chain 
transformation of agriculture and agri-food production in terms of its technological and institutional 
dimensions, and the interplay between innovation and adaptation. Policymakers likely have little role 
technologically in the development of new ag-data use-cases; instead, their role is in governing the institutional 
structures that determine who controls and, thus benefits from, ag-data. Therefore, the policy objective is to 
arrive at an institutional configuration whereby ag-data generates the most economic value, while also ensuring 
that benefits are distributed equitably (i.e. abating secondary use-cases while promoting primary and tertiary 
use-cases across the value chain). 
 So far, the digitization of agriculture and agri-food production has mainly involved farm equipment 
collecting and leveraging ag-data to improve primary production (i.e. precision agriculture). The sensor 
technologies that generate ag-data are now well into the mid-stages of adoption, having been widely available 
to producers for over a decade. Though thousands of producers continuously generate a high volume, variety, 
and velocity of ag-data for primary use, it remains unclear where, how, and to what extent ag-data are 
migrating to new use-cases in the broader value chain. It is also unclear whether, in the long term, off-farm use-
cases stand to generate more overall value than precision agriculture. Progress in the development of secondary 
and tertiary use appears to be somewhat gradual, potentially due to a lack of institutional alignment (i.e. 
innovation) among agribusinesses. Thus, policymakers are faced with the challenge of governing not what is 
already possible, but rather helping to refine what will become possible at some indeterminate point in the 
future.  
 On the other hand, several signals indicate that agribusinesses are in the early stages of defining 
structures of control over ag-data flows which will largely determine who wins or loses once the latent potential 
is unlocked, through secondary and tertiary use, from rapidly expanding troves of ag-data. Thereafter, those in 
control will either themselves leverage ag-data in potentially powerful ways or sell it to other players who can. 
In any case, considerable effort from major agribusiness players is now underway to control the accumulation 
of ag-data, much as the major technology platforms of the early 2000s (e.g. Facebook, Apple, Google) then 
positioned themselves to control the accumulation of user data—even before they had developed the use-cases 
to fully exploit its value. 
 
 
4.4 THE STATUS QUO: STRUCTURES OF CONTROL 
 
 In light of clear efforts by agribusinesses to control ag-data flows, policymakers must assess the status 
quo and determine where it serves the public interest and where intervention is necessary. Currently, too little 




flows, particularly given that the potential use-cases motivating these efforts also remain unclear (and likely 
underdeveloped technologically). However, the fact that agribusinesses are now collecting and controlling large 
volumes of ag-data should be enough to motivate policymakers to investigate the potential movement of ag-
data between ATPs. As major agribusinesses “like John Deere and DowDuPont invest million to create data 
warehouses,”88 it is critical that policymakers understand whether and to whom ag-data are being sold across 
the value chain well before off-farm use-cases emerge.  
 The current institutional framework lacks definition of formal legal institutions: ag-data ‘ownership’ 
remains a misnomer outside of informal contracts that apply vaguely (if at all) to the generation, storage, 
sharing, transacting, and use of ag-data.89 Those institutions do exist can be described as structures of control—
layered institutional and technological advantages that enable control over flows of capital, goods, and data. 
These layers reinforce one another through positive-feedback dynamics that create path dependence, as 
captured in Shapiro and Varian’s concepts of network effects and lock-in.90 On the importance of technological 
capacity to the ownership and control of data, de Beer notes that “the physicality of data-related systems cannot 
be ignored when considering ownership issues.”91Janzen further emphasizes that, without formal property 
rights, control is tantamount to ownership: “There are companies out there that say ‘yes, you own the data,’ but 
when you read the agreements you find out that they have an unlimited licence to do whatever they want with 
the data. They own it from the standpoint that they can do whatever they want with it.”92 Indeed, in lieu of 
formal legal structures to delineate ownership in ag-data, de facto ownership falls to the agribusinesses that 
collect, store, and control ag-data. 
 This is the status quo. Ellixon and Griffin noted that, as of 2016, “no existing laws cover farm data 
ownership or implications of misappropriation of that data.”93 Three years later, there is no evidence that this 
has changed within any legal jurisdiction, whether in Canada, the United States, Australia, or within the EU or 
its member countries.94 Responding to a webinar question asking whether “a machine [could] track and send 
data to the manufacturer without the owner's consent [or knowledge]," agricultural lawyer Todd Janzen 
confirmed that, “[f]rom [his] research, the general answer to this question [was] ‘yes’.” However, he also 
recognized a few potential exceptions pursuant to some US state laws where ag-data contain “personally 
identifiable information” or where “unauthorized data sharing” has occurred.95 In Canada, there appear to be no 
laws on the books that would limit the ability of agribusinesses to use or share ag-data from Canadian farms. In 
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an email response to an inquiry from The Western Producer, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner responded 
only that ‘deceptive marketing provisions’ under the Competition Act “may apply” to firms using ag-data 
without the consent of the relevant producer, adding only that “[b]ig data can have implications for other policy 
areas beyond competition law but the Bureau must restrict its activities to its mandate as set out in the 
Competition Act” and that “[t]he Bureau has not brought any cases specifically addressing the misuse of data in 
the farming industry.”96 In response to the same inquiry from The Western Producer, Agriculture and Agri-food 
Canada stated that “[h]ow the data generated on-farm is used or shared beyond this purpose depends on 
agreements between farmers and their equipment providers,” but that “AAFC has begun consulting with other 
departments and international organizations to help determine what role government should play.”97  
 Many experts have argued that leaving the question of ownership in ag-data to contracts between 
agribusinesses and producer is insufficient if the goal is to protect and empower producers to share in the value 
generated by off-farm use-cases. Janzen notes that most contracts defining the terms of ag-data ownership use 
boilerplate user agreements that fail to recognize the way in which ag-data is “is a different type of commodity 
than the data you have on Facebook or Twitter.”98 According to a recent survey by Farm Credit Canada (FCC), 
65% of Canadian producers surveyed did not understand the terms of their contracts with respect to data 
ownership, though they were highly concerned with “the conditions governing the use and treatment of [their] 
data by an outside party” (42% considered the issue ‘very important’ and 29% ‘extremely important).’99 The 
author of this survey also noted that roughly 80% of respondents chose to provide “additional comments” at the 
end of the survey (normally, only 30-35% chose to fill out this section), many reporting discontent at 
discovering that an agribusiness had shared ag-data from their farm without permission100 
 However, even with clearer contracts, the problem remains that agribusinesses are under no obligation 
to contractually recognize a property interest in ag-data held by producers. When asked his view on the future 
of ag-data, one founder of an ag-tech startup commented that, under the status quo vis-à-vis ag-data ownership, 
“the benefits to the farmer at the farm level are going to be very minor,” and that “[t]he majority of that value 
[will] go to the groups that control the flow of data and the analytical service providers.” 101 de Beer notes that, 
generally, without a legal framework to delineate ownership to producers, “[m]ost ownership rights accrue to 
the intermediaries that invest in databases, not persons who provide or use data.”102  
 These comments, and many others from a range of experts, indicate that the status quo may be 
misaligned with the interests of producers, particularly in the long-term. This suggests a policy gap—
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particularly with respect to ag-data ownership. Further, the opportunity to intervene proactively is now; 
policymakers should not wait to react to disruption as secondary and tertiary use-cases emerge. The relevant 
question is how policy might shape institutions that will limit the potential for exploitation (i.e. secondary use) 
and empower producers to share in future value generated by off-farm use-cases (i.e. tertiary use).  
 Figure 3 illustrates the institutional status quo with respect to control over ag-data. Under this 
institutional framework, agribusinesses excise de facto ownership in ag-data through technical, financial, and 
knowledge advantages. The importance of the technological advantages large agribusinesses hold over 
individual producers cannot be as “technological measures work along with legal measures to facilitate or 
frustrate access to data.”103 In most current contracts defining the terms of ag-data use, legal measures weighing 
in favour of producer ownership are the exception rather than rule, making the discrepancy in technological 
capacity between agribusinesses and producers all the more relevant. Further, technological capacity is critical 
not only to controlling ag-data, but also to leveraging it in secondary and tertiary use-cases. Though farmers 
hold (and benefit from) the capacity for primary use, this only guarantees the continuous flow of ag-data into 
databases controlled by agribusinesses which—though they may currently lack the capacity for secondary and 
tertiary use—are currently miles ahead of producers technologically in terms of their readiness to leverage ag-
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Figure 4.1: The Institutional 'Status Quo' 
Figure 3 illustrates how, under the status quo, institutional control over and access to ag-data, coupled with the 
technological capacity to leverage ag-data off-farm, are the necessary conditions to capture the benefits of 
digital innovation across the agriculture and agri-food value chain. Today, only agribusinesses and ATPs are in 




                                                   




4.5 AG-DATA MARKETS: CLASSICAL OR BEHAVIOURAL APPROACH? 
 
 It is clear that policy intervention is needed to create an environment wherein agricultural producers 
can share in the benefits of off-farm ag-data use and, by extension, the impending value chain transformation of 
agriculture and agri-food production. The question, then, concerns which institutional mechanisms would 
create the necessary conditions to achieve a more equitable distribution of benefits, and by extension, greater 
adoption and diffusion. Under the status quo, agribusinesses hold several massive advantages over producers.  
 To start, these large, multinational, and often vertically-integrated firms control the technological 
systems that store and centralize the ag-data collected from thousands of farms; only they can access these 
troves of ag-data, which are far more valuable in aggregate. Even if it were possible for a handful of producers 
to withhold or remove the data they generated from these databases, their pooled data would be little more than 
a drop in the bucket. The major players in agribusiness—whether in biotechnology, agrichemicals, or 
machinery—occupy a critical position in the commercial ecosystem, which all but guarantees their continued 
role as the core providers of precision agriculture technologies. Their position is highly centralized while that of 
each individual producer is diffuse and, thus, negligible. Furthermore, producers operate in a highly 
competitive environment wherein they must avail all potential advantages to remain profitable. This means 
adopting precision agriculture technologies will only become more and more critical to their commercial 
success, a dynamic that is increasingly self-reinforcing as rates of adoption increase. 
 With respect to governing ag-data, there is no escaping the reality that producers “are already squeezed 
by the greater market power of their upstream and downstream partners.”104 Although the power of 
agribusiness firms is centralized while that of producers is diffuse, there are opportunities to “organise data 
ownership and access so that the position of farmers is improved and not weakened by the new technology,” to 
quote EU Agriculture Commissioner Phil Hogan.105  
 Formal property rights in ag-data may the best mechanism for achieving this goal. Delineating a 
property interest in ag-data for producers could enable a market structure whereby producers and stakeholders 
could coordinate to promote positive-sum use-cases for ag-data across the broader value chain. If producers 
entered this market holding property rights in ag-data, they could choose to exchange their ag-data with 
agribusinesses for monetary compensation. Provided that the compensation demanded by producers was less 
than the potential value agribusinesses could generate through off-farm use-cases for ag-data, this arrangement 
could provide an institutional framework for ag-data use that would effectively balance goals of efficiency and 
equity.  
                                                   





 Figure 4 depicts this improved institutional arrangement, illustrating how the inclusion of property 
rights held by producers could create the conditions for an ag-data market, which would still allow for the 
creation of new value (i.e. efficiency), but distribute its benefits more equitably.  
 
















Distribution of Benefits and Costs 
Figure 4.2: Ag-Data Markets 
 A handful of nascent ag-data markets (and, by extension, some form of producer ownership in ag-data) 
already exist today on a direct agribusiness-to-producer basis.106 Farmobile’s ‘DataStore’ and Decisive 
Farming’s Optimize RX variable rate data platform bothoffer producers payments in the range of $4 per acre 
for VRT-generated ag-data in malt barley production.107 In the first case, producers’ sale of ag-data is optional 
and allows them to specify which third-parties are allowed access;108 in the second case, producers using the 
OptimizeRX platform necessarily grant use to Decisive Farming, but expressly in the context of researching 
malt-barley production.109 These atomized, bilateral market arrangements are the most likely template for early 
ag-data markets; though one could also foresee more complex, multi-lateral markets involving several 
producers and agribusinesses, the attending opportunities and risks would also be more complex and difficult to 
model. The sharing or transacting of ag-data between agri-businesses is another extant form of ag-data market, 
though such activity—while not illegal (most use contracts that assign producers no property interest in ag-
data)—likely occurs privately to avoid scrutiny. 
 There are many arguments to support the market as a distributional mechanism, many of which focus 
on their efficiency and capacity to manage complexity through what Hayek termed ‘spontaneous order,’ 
occurring as “the result of human actions, not of human design.”110 Classical economics, as explicitly 
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formulated in the Coase theorem, holds that delineating clear property rights in ag-data—i.e. rights to use and 
exclude others from using—would, assuming sufficiently low transaction costs, enable ‘Coasian bargaining’ 
that would result in Pareto-efficient outcomes.111 In other words, provided property rights in ag-data are clearly 
defined, the right to use ag-data would flow, though bargaining, to the party who values them most—i.e. the 
party capable of using ag-data to generate the greatest economic value, thus producing the most efficient (if not 
necessarily most equitable) outcome. 
 Contrary to the Coase theorem, this thesis posits that assigning property rights in ag-data may prove 
necessary but not sufficient to realizing the most efficient environment wherein ag-data are efficiently 
leveraged and exchanged. Policy must also appreciate that this environment may elude the standard economic 
assumption that markets will efficiently coordinate exchanges, regardless of their initial allocation, given 
clearly-delineated property rights.112 Potential behavioural dynamics underlying ag-data exchange between 
producers and agribusinesses may impede Coasian bargaining, resulting in outcomes that are neither efficient 
nor equitable. This could mean that it matters, in terms of not only equity but efficiency, to whom property 
rights in ag-data are initially assigned; even that the notion of ag-data markets itself is fraught with problems 
grounded in the dynamics of behaviour. 
 Approaching this question, it is sensible to start with producers, who, in the early stages of digitization, 
have the least information with which to accurately value ag-data generated from their operations. Though 
producers are compelled by the demands of end-consumers and face pressure from both ends of the value 
chain, they retain significant agency over their commercial and production decisions. Producer actions and 
decisions animate myriad, seasonal, ag-production cycles that overlap at staggered intervals across diverse 
geographies. Complex sets of individual producer decisions determine the composition of the global food 
supply to the extent that producers retain the prerogative to decide which crops they grow, when, and using 
which tools; the sum of their individual choices dictates, in part, the availability and nutritional content of the 
food staples consumed across the globe.113 
 Therefore, the choice architecture of decisions that producers face on-farm—and their personal 
attributes affecting these decisions—could matter in the context of bargaining. North American producers are 
characteristically independent and shrewdly skeptical of unproven technologies.114 Yet technology is core to 
their production activities, which frequently absorb early waves of technological diffusion.115 The adoption rate 
of on-farm innovations, as well as how producers use these tools, determines the volume, variety, and velocity 
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of ag-data generated. This edifice of ag-data rules shapes future possibilities for value chain ag-data use and its 
consequent pathways for creative destruction.116  
 Various literatures have investigated producer adoption of on-farm technologies.117 Instead, this thesis 
aims to simulate producer decision-making in a notional market for ag-data—data generated from their farm 
and through their production activities. It is likely that a complex array of behavioural dimensions influence 
producers’ valuation and decisions related to ag-data. However, for policymakers, a sensible starting point may 
be to simulate how producers would behave were property rights clearly delineated. This thesis applies a 
behavioral approach to one piece of the larger policy puzzle, considering the question of whether initial 
assignment of ownership affects outcomes in an environment wherein ag-data are transacted—or, as 
characterized in the seminal work of Kahneman and Tversky, and at the heart of many behavioural questions, 
‘Does starting point matter?’118 Behavioural science asserts that when this question is answered affirmatively 
we are observing an endowment effect—i.e. when the condition of ownership, itself, leads the owner to 
irrationally overvalue an asset qua possession.119 Inversely, the endowment effect could be construed in terms of 
the condition of non-ownership, where the non-owner undervalues an asset when faced with the choice to 
purchase said asset.  
 Determining if and to what extent the endowment effect factors into ag-data transactions could greatly 
help policymakers understand, in terms of both efficiency and equity, the potential impacts of delineating ag-
data ownership to producers versus agribusinesses and whether Coasian bargaining alone could work with that 
assignment to realize outcomes that align with the public interest. To that end, this thesis advances a behavioral 
experiment, surveying a large classroom of agriculture students—a proxy for Canadian producers—at the 
University of Saskatchewan to test their decision-making vis-à-vis transacting ag-data. The presence of an 
endowment effect, and the impact of worldviews thereon, would suggest that the initial allocation of property 
rights over ag-data would (or already does) influence outcomes in markets for ag-data (existing or imminent). 
Getting clearer answers to these questions could help policymakers better understand whether Coasian 
bargaining can be expected to result in an efficient allocation of property rights in ag-data. 
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 Whereas other schools of economics focus primarily on conditions outside the individual (e.g. laws, 
endowments, capabilities, etc.) that shape markets and determine market outcomes, behavioural economics 
considers how the structures of the human mind respond to particular sets of external conditions (i.e. the 
‘choice architecture’ or ‘framing’ of individual economic decisions). Studying these cognitive structures has 
revealed a stunning range of predicable ‘systematic biases’ in human cognition.120 Understanding and 
accounting for these biases in policymaking can help improve the quality of economic policies.  
  The previous section identified that institutionally the status quo would benefit from formal 
proprietary definition. This thesis confronts the question of how policy could better structure and define, 
delineate, and allocate property rights in ag-data. Classical economics holds that, if policy added greater 
proprietary definition to ag-data markets, rational actors, regardless of the initial assignment of ownership, will 
transact to efficiently allocate property rights. However, this view contradicts a considerable body of evidence 
from experiments in the behavioural literature showing that actors often make very different transactional 
decisions depending on whether they own the item in question. This section reviews the behavioural literature 
on the endowment effect and its influence on bargaining as well as the literature on ‘worldviews’ as a 
secondary behavioural component. 
 
5.2 THE ENDOWMENT EFFECT 
 
 A defining assumption in classical economics is that individuals, given sufficient information, will 
behave in markets as rational actors, seeking to maximize their individual utility (often based on individual 
preferences) under whichever circumstances they may face. This assumption confers a large measure of 
predictability of individual behaviour such that modelling various economic scenarios need only consider 
parameters for individual preferences and external economic conditions. Contrarily, behavioural economics 
acknowledges not only the relevant individual preferences and external conditions, but also how individuals 
perceive or contextualize information about these external conditions (i.e. framing).  
 In bargaining scenarios, the classical economic assumption is that the difference between ‘willingness 
to pay’ and ‘willingness to accept’ should be negligible.121 However, in a 1980 paper seminal in establishing 
behavioural economics, Thaler identified a pattern he dubbed the endowment effect—“the fact that people 
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often demand much more to give up an object they would be willing to pay to acquire it.”122 This paper strongly 
challenged the assumption that entitlements do not impact valuation by showing that, under certain 
circumstances, individuals’ selling prices considerably exceed their buying prices. One example showed that 
“the minimal compensation demanded for accepting a .001 risk of sudden death was higher by one or two 
orders of magnitude than the amount people were willing to pay to eliminate an identical existing risk.”123 
Thaler has since demonstrated many examples of the endowment effect, “especially for goods that are not 
regularly traded.”124 
 A year before Thaler’s 1980s thesis establishing the ‘endowment effect,’ two of behavioural 
economics’ other founding fathers, Kahneman and Tversky, had published their own defining work in the 
discipline. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk” introduced the concept of ‘loss aversion,’ 
“the generalization that losses are weighted substantially more than objectively commensurate gains in the 
evaluation of prospects and trades.”125 Their new ‘prospect theory’ challenged the ‘expected utility theory’ 
from classical economics and, by extension, the “wide acceptance of the Coase theorem assertion that, subject 
to income effects, the allocation of resources will be independent of the assignment of property rights when 
costless trades are possible.”126 Prospect theory provided a theoretical context for Thaler’s observations of the 
endowment effect and “other puzzles in his collection,”127 by explaining how and why the reference point for 
individuals valuing an asset differs greatly depending on whether they stand to ‘gain’ or ‘lose’ that asset. 
Kahneman and Tverkey’s explanation was that, due to ‘loss aversion,’ individuals making a transactional 
decision weigh the ‘pain’ of losing an item more than the ‘pleasure’ of acquiring that same item and, thus, 
value it more under the condition of ownership.128  
 Years later, Kahneman and Thaler would collaborate (along with Canadian economist Jack Knetsch) to 
further develop the concept of the endowment effect. Their 1991 paper, “Experimental Tests of the Endowment 
Effect and the Coase Theorem” deals explicitly with the implications of loss aversion in the context of 
bargains, challenging the ‘expected utility theory’ that underpins the Coase theorem and its conclusions about 
the minimal conditions necessary to produce efficient market outcomes.129 The 1991 paper distinguishes 
between the effects of loss aversion and other factors that would potentially contribute to “discrepancies 
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between the evaluations of buyers and sellers,”130 such as the perceived illegitimacy of a transaction the part of 
the prospective seller,131 standard bargaining habits,132 and actors habitually misrepresenting their true 
valuations as a sheer strategic mistake.133 By contrast, loss aversion is understood to produce this discrepancy 
in valuations not as an intentional distortion or misrepresentation of value, but rather a deeper, fundamental 
difference in individual preference caused by their initial endowment (or lack thereof). 
 The 1991 paper also introduced the critical distinction between items held “for exchange” versus those 
held “for use.”134 Loss aversion does not (at least, as forcefully) influence an individual’s valuation of an item 
held for ‘exchange,’ which, by definition, the owner intends to hold only temporarily, all the while perceiving it 
as merely “a cumbersome proxy for money that he was hoping to collect from the consumer” (e.g. how the 
owner of a shoe store views the shoes in his or her inventory).135 On the other hand, though the owner of an 
item held ‘for use’ would not experience loss aversion when faced with the decision to acquire an item (e.g. 
when buying a pair of shoes from a shoe store), the same owner would experience loss aversion if faced with 
the decision to sell that same item he or she had just acquired ‘for use’ (e.g. if a friend offered to buy the same 
‘brand-new’ shoes from the original purchaser). 
 This notion of items held ‘for exchange’ versus ‘for use’ is pertinent in the context of this thesis, whose 
primary hypothesis is that agricultural producers’ will value property rights in ag-data more if they enter the 
bargain as owners. In more formal terms, this thesis conveys an analysis that tests for the presence of the 
endowment effect, which, as explained above, occurs when the condition of ownership itself leads the owner to 
irrationally overvalue an asset or possession (in this case, property rights in ag-data).  
 For several reasons, ag-data are to be considered as the subject of bargaining. Both producers and 
agribusinesses ‘use’ ag-data in a ‘primary’ capacity, so both should regard it as an item held ‘for use’ rather 
than ‘for exchange.’ In the ‘for use’ context, ag-data’s value is determined by the utility its use can produce for 
the owner; in turn, the utility it can produce for its owner depends on the owner’s technological capacity to 
apply the ag-data to a productive use-case. While the producer has the capacity to use and derive utility from 
ag-data on-farm (i.e. precision agriculture), only (some) agribusinesses likely hold the capacity to use (i.e. 
derive utility from) ag-data through off-farm use-cases. So, regarding a producer selling property rights in ag-
data to an agribusiness for use in an off-farm capacity, the question becomes whether the producer would 
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regard the same ag-data as an item held ‘for exchange’ so long as he or she can continue using ag-data in a 
primary capacity? 
 Indeed, in general, data are unique assets in that the same data are infinitely replicable: the same 
information can be copied infinitely for use by as many individuals as can access their own copy. However, 
much like other intangible assets (e.g. intellectual property rights), use of a dataset can be rivalrous (i.e. one’s 
use of data toward a particular end could reduce the utility of another’s use of that same data). Therefore, the 
value of property rights in ag-data lies in the owner’s ability to not only use these data but also (through force 
of property law) to exclude others from using it in ways contrary to the owner’s interests (in the case of this 
thesis, ‘secondary use’). This is relevant in that that some off-farm use-cases for ag-data pose the risk of 
generating utility for the agribusiness and disutility for the producer (i.e. secondary use). Therefore, whether in 
the context of on-farm or off-farm use, a producer will likely regard ag-data as an item held ‘for use’ rather than 
‘for exchange,’ regardless of the use-case. Therefore, it is a reasonable hypothesis that producers with a 




 Beyond the endowment effect, this thesis also explores whether producers’ ‘worldviews’ attenuate the 
presence of the endowment effect in their transactional decision-making. The concept of ‘worldviews’ demands 
some elaboration. The cultural cognition literature may represent the most sophisticated effort to examine the 
impact of worldviews on decision-making, particularly in the context of risk perception, scientific consensus, 
and public policy.136 Though its contributions are certainly pertinent to the questions at hand, this thesis instead 
adopts a less-explored theoretical framework defining worldviews. This framework originates from Gilpin in 
the international political economy (IPE) literature, further developed in respective contributions from Cohn 
and Phillips.137  
 The field of IPE emerged in the early 1970s based on recognition of the need to further integrate the 
study of international politics with that of an increasingly globalized economy. Early contributions from 
Strange, Cohn and Gilpin, among others, noted a greater need to account for the interrelationship between not 
only states, but also “multinational corporations, interest groups and international political and trade regimes 
that render the traditional state-market and international-domestic dichotomies insufficient frameworks for 
analysis.”138 
                                                   
136 Kahan, “Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection”; Kahan and Braman, “Cultural Cognition and 
Public Policy”; Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, and Braman, “Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus”; Kahan et al., “The 
Polarizing Impact of Science Literacy and Numeracy on Perceived Climate Change Risks”; Kahan et al., “Cultural 
Cognition of the Risks and Benefits of Nanotechnology.” 
137 Cohn, Global Political Economy. 




 A handful of years into the early development of the IPE literature, Gilpin’s 1975 article “Three models 
for the future” recognized that three distinct empirical and normative camps had begun to coalesce within the 
literature, each incorporating its own theoretical influences from prior scholarship in political science, 
economics, and political theory to the fledgling discipline of IPE.139 Gilpin proposed that each camp offered not 
only their own unique analytical approach to understanding current developments in the international political-
economic order, but also three unique ‘models for the future’ (with respect to both ongoing scholarship and the 
policy prescriptions flowing therefrom): “These models are really representative of the three prevailing schools 
of thought on political economy: liberalism, Marxism, and economic nationalism. Each model is an amalgam 
of the ideas of several writers who, in my judgment (or by their own statements), fall into one or another of 
these three perspectives on the relationship of economic and political affairs.”140 
 Gilpin defined liberalism by the view that “increasing economic interdependence and technological 
advances in communication and transportation” had “undermined the traditional economic rationale of state,” 
further characterizing that “in the interest of world efficiency and domestic economic welfare, the nation state’s 
control over economic affairs will continually give way to the multinational corporation” and “other 
international institutions better suited to the economic needs of mankind.”141 Next, Gilpin defined Marxism (or 
the ‘dependencia model’) by its conception of a “hierarchical and exploitative world order” in which “the flow 
of wealth and benefits,” through the same mechanisms of globalization heralded by liberals, “from the global, 
underdeveloped periphery to the centers of industrial financial power and decision.”142 In essence, the Marxist 
camp views what liberals conceive as ‘transnationalism’ to really be a form of ‘imperialism’ disguised as 
benevolent liberalization of global markets. Last, Gilpin defined economic nationalism (or ‘the mercantilist 
model’), in contrast to both liberalism and Marxism, as maintaining a view of the nation-state as the dominant 
player in the international political-economic order and “the interplay of national interests (as distinct from 
corporate interests) as the primary determinants of the future role of the world economy.”143 
 Gilpin’s tripartite characterization of the study of IPE has proved to be a durable framework for 
understanding not only the IPE literature, but also contemporary political and economic debates characterized 
by rising populism, technological displacement, and the changing dynamics of global trade. Cohn’s defining 
textbook on IPE, “Global Political Economy: Theory and Practice,” continued Gilpin’s tripartite framework, 
accounting more fully for the prior theoretical underpinnings of each while also capturing how each has 
developed throughout the evolution of IPE as a literature.144 Gilpin’s ‘economic nationalism’ was broadened to 
                                                   









embrace the canon of ‘realism’ in the field of international relations, with roots extending as far back as 
Thucydides, through Machiavelli, Alexander Hamilton, and up to early 20th Century thinkers like Keynes, and 
later ones like Morganthau, Waltz, and Kissinger. Similarly, Cohn broadened Gilpin’s conception of liberalism, 
rooting it in the tradition established by Adam Smith and John Locke, later inherited and developed in the work 
of 20th century neo-classical economists like Hayek and Friedman. Finally, Cohn developed Gilpin’s concept of 
Marxism well beyond its namesake to incorporate, among many others, the related thought of Gramsci, 
Wallerstein, and several scholars in the broader feminist and critical literatures.145 
 This thesis attempts to adapt this tripartite schema from the international relations and IPE literatures to 
a novel context: the worldviews of agricultural producers and their opinions of the influence of transactional 
decision-making on ag-data. It may seem a leap to assert that the descriptive and normative commitments of 
scholars in a particular academic discipline constitute an appropriate framework in which to categorize the 
‘worldviews’ or ideological commitments of individuals far removed from the original context; this thesis fully 
admits to the preliminary and experimental nature of this exercise, which, at this point, is intended as nothing 
else. Nonetheless, the intuitiveness of Gilpin’s tripartite framework suggests that the bundles of ideological 
commitments encapsulated in each of the three categories could, to some extent, align with those held by others 
(including agricultural producers). This thesis recasts the three categories into the following template: 
• The realist worldview is characterized by prioritization of the state, state power, zero-sum dynamics, 
nationalism, politics over economics, a mercantilist view of trade and globalization, and a state-driven 
process of innovation and economic development. Today, the global rise of nationalism and a shift in 
global trade toward protectionism led by the US under the presidency of Donald Trump best exemplify 
the realist worldview in the contemporary context.  
• The liberal worldview is characterized by prioritization of the individual, economic power, positive-
sum dynamics, individualism, privileging economics over politics, a laissez faire view of trade and 
globalization, and a market-driven process of innovation and economic development. Liberalism has 
been the dominant global force in the post-WWII global order, strengthening under the neoliberal 
reforms of the 1980s and with the fall of communism that ended the Cold War. However, the 
international liberal order is today challenged by the same forces of nationalism and protectionism. 
• The critical worldview prioritizes identity-based groups, relational power between groups, negative-
sum dynamics, group identity, a conflictual view of politics and economics, a dependency-based view 
of trade and globalization, and the need for socially-directed goals for innovation and economic 
development. 





CHAPTER VI. METHODS AND HYPOTHESIS 
 
6.1 STUDY OVERVIEW 
 
 This study employed a behavioural methodology to test for the presence of an endowment effect in 
subjects’ valuation of ag-data. An online survey instrument was chosen to effectively reach a statistically 
significant sample and establish a controlled environment appropriate for measuring the behaviour of 
respondents. Care was taken to ensure that, throughout the survey, exposure to information was consistent and 
neutral, the goal being to provide sufficient context to simulate the real-world experience of an agricultural 
producer engaged in a bargaining scenario. The survey’s primary objective was to measure the impact of the 
endowment (the key independent variable) on producers’ valuation of ag-data (the key dependent variable). 
The secondary objective was to measure the strength of respondents’ propensity toward one of three 
worldviews (secondary independent variable) and its impact on their valuations of ag-data. The experiment and 
survey instrument were designed and programmed in consultation with the Social Science Research Lab at the 
University of Saskatchewan. 
 This SSHRC-funded experiment received full ethics approval from the University of Saskatchewan 
Research Ethics Board. Voxco, a Canadian-owned and managed company whose data is securely stored in 
Canada, digitally hosted the survey. All user data from respondents was anonymized and no foreseeable risks 
were identified in the ethics approval process.  
 
6.2 EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
 
 The primary objective of the behavioural experiment was to test for the endowment effect in 
respondents’ valuation of ag-data. To avoid order effects (e.g. fatigue, unintended knowledge), the experiment 
adopted a between-group design whereby the repsondents were randomly assigned to one of two treatments. 
The first treatment (T1) measured respondents’ ‘willingness to accept’ while the second treatment (T2) 
measured respondents’ ‘willingness to pay.’ Given the between-group experiment design, the language of each 
treatment differed minimally (i.e. only enough to convey the intended meaning) in order to control for the 
distinct effect of each treatment in isolation from arbitrary differences that could introduce noise into the 
results. Further, the experiment was designed to conceal from respondents its true purpose (to measure for the 
presence of the endowment effect): by definition, the endowment effect can exist only insofar as a subject 
remains unaware of its influence on their valuation process. Thus, respondents were provided no prior 
introduction to the concept of the endowment effect (or biases in decision-making, more generally), nor were 
respondents informed that they would receive one of two opposing treatments. The experiment was conducted 




advance with classmates and other volunteers to ensure the intended meaning was successfully conveyed in the 
language used. 
 
6.2.1 The Experiment Brief 
 
 The first survey component was a short 325-word ‘Experiment Brief’ designed to situate the 
respondent in the context of an agricultural producer making a transactional decision regarding the transfer of 
property rights in ag-data. Excerpted fully in Figure 5, the brief conveyed that the object of this bargain was ag-
data generated from the respondent’s own farming operation. The language was carefully chosen to subtly 
suggest potential (but uncertain) risks associated with an agribusiness owning the respondent’s ag-data. This 
subtlety was critical to avoid ‘leading’ the respondent toward overemphasizing risk (i.e. ‘secondary ag-data 
use’) over benefit (i.e. money) in their decision making. Each respondent, whether assigned to T1 or T2, 
received the same brief to ‘calibrate’ him or her before the experiment, whereupon the total sample group was 
split roughly in half. Calibration increased the likelihood that differences in the results from each group resulted 
from their respective treatments rather than from irrelevant characteristics between participants (e.g. the 
varying degree of subject knowledge among respondents). Last, the brief was designed to inform, but not 
exhaust, the reader such that he or she was maximally engaged in the subsequent experiment. 
 
 
Before the experiment, it is very important that you have a bit of background information. We would 
like you to imagine that you are a farmer facing new decisions and challenges in today’s increasingly 
data-driven world: 
 
As a farmer, new digital technologies enable you to bring science to the management of your farm. 
Data enable you to understand the relationships between complex variables (e.g. soil, seed, chemical 
inputs, yield and quality), which can help you make better decisions and increase your productivity and 
efficiency. We will call these on-farm activities the ‘primary use’ for ag-data. As a leading-edge 
farmer, you generate and use vast amounts of data each season. Your data is likely also very valuable 
to agribusiness firms whose businesses would benefit from having this information (e.g. yield, soil 
conditions, input decisions, etc.). While it is clear how data is used on-farm to improve production, less 
is known about how data can be used off-farm by agribusinesses in other activities (e.g. marketing, 
manufacturing, market speculation, etc.). We will call any such activates by agribusiness firms 
‘secondary uses’ for ag-data. 
 
These secondary uses raise questions about data ownership, which is defined as an exclusive right to 
control how others can use data. In other words, if you (the farmer) own data, you have the right to 
prevent agribusinesses from using it in ways that may go against your interests. Ownership also means 
that you reserve the right to negotiate a fee if companies wish to use your data for any secondary 
activities; if they are not willing to pay, you can deny them access to the data. On the other hand, if an 
agribusiness company owns this data, they are free to use it in whichever ways might benefit their 
business. In this scenario, they may allow you to use the data generated on your farm if you are paying 





Figure 6.1: The Experiment Brief 
 
6.2.2 The Endowment Effect 
 
 The second survey component was the behavioural experiment, which randomly assigned roughly half 
the sample group to T1 and the other half to T2. The experiment was positioned as early as possible in the 
survey to avoid behavioural measurements being tainted by the influence of subsequent ‘worldview’ questions. 
The experiment simulated a scenario wherein respondents were asked to imagine themselves as producers 
participating in a market for ag-data in which a large agribusiness firm (i.e. “Company X”) was their 
counterparty. In this market, each respondent (qua producer) was asked to value the ag-data based on very 
limited information about potential risks associated with Company X owning ag-data from the respondent’s 
farm. Conversely, the monetary value associated with transferring ownership (i.e. either paying to buy or 
receiving to sell) was known to the participant. 
 
Imagine that you own and operate a large area farm producing crops in Western Canada. In the last 
decade, you have successfully managed this operation and, each year, your level of comfort with 
precision farming technologies continues to grow. You exclusively use AgManufacturing Co. 
equipment and recently adopted their fully-integrated precision agriculture suite, AgPrecisionTM. This 
investment has significantly increased your yields while, at the same time, reducing chemical use and 
associated costs. As you collect more data each season, you learn more about your land and how to 
farm it most efficiently. Given all the success you have experienced, you intend to continue using this 





Figure 6.2: Treatment 1 
 T1 assigned property rights in ag-data to the participant (qua producer) and asked the minimum price at 
which he or she would be willing to transfer ownership to Company X. Conversely, T2 assigned property rights 
in ag-data to Company X and asked the maximum price each participant would be willing to pay to acquire 
ownership. Under both treatments, respondents were presented with a range of dollar values, per acre of land, 
for ag-data rights. The options ranged from a minimum of ‘$0’ to a maximum of ‘more than $18’, with the 
interval variable scaled in increments of $3.  
 As demonstrated in the excerpted survey questions (Figures X & Y), Treatments 1 and 2 differed only 
enough to convey the opposite initial assignment of ownership in ag-data (language otherwise differed 
minimally). The decision facing the respondent was not one of a set of iterated transactions (for a finite volume 
of ag-data), but rather a one-off transaction for all ag-data, past and future, generated as long as the respondent 










 The third survey component presented nine questions designed to capture the strength of respondent’s 
orientation toward one of three worldviews (i.e. Realist, Liberal, and Critical). Respondents were assigned one 
point for each answer that corresponded to one of the three worldviews. Table 1 provides the template that 






Realist Liberal Critical 
Q1 International Free Trade 
It has some benefits but 
should be limited where it 
causes domestic problems 
(e.g. regional unemployment, 
security risks, or erosion of 
national independence). 
It increases overall wellbeing 
and states should trade as 
openly with one another as 
possible. 
It primarily benefits those who 
are already wealthy, deprives 





Table 6.1: Worldview Survey Questions 
 
Most questions offered only three answers; only Q8 provided several worldview-neutral options as well as two 
options representing each worldview. One point was counted for each answer corresponding to a respective 
worldview, except in Q8 (where maximum of two points could be counted toward each worldview). To 
reiterate, the purpose of this section was to probe, first, whether the worldview, unto itself, constitutes an 
independent variable impacting data valuation and, second, whether worldviews constitutes an intervening 
variable that attenuates the endowment effect, positively or negatively. 
 
6.2.4 Demographic Questions 
 
 The fourth and last survey component presented seven demographic questions related to age, gender, 
ethnicity, academic program, and personal background vis-à-vis agriculture. The entire survey lasted no longer 
than 30 minutes in duration.  
Q2 R&D and Innovation 
Canada should invest heavily 
and take a large role in 
setting the R&D and 
innovation agenda. 
Most impactful R&D and 
innovation takes place in the 
private sector and the agenda 
should be determined 
by consumers in the market. 
R&D and innovation should be 
aimed primarily at addressing 
social issues. 
Q3 Best represents Your Interests 








That it is produced in Canada 
and strengthens our economy 
That I can buy it at the lowest 
possible price 
That it is ethically-sourced and 
produced with minimal 
negative impact 
Q5 Globalization 
Despite some positive 
consequences, it has 
undermined Canada’s ability 
to protect national interests 
and has been detrimental to 
national culture. 
It has enriched the world both 
culturally and economically 
and has improved the 
wellbeing of most people 
across the globe. 
Despite some positive 
consequences, it has 
perpetuated and deepened 
inequalities between different 
groups 
Q5 Personal Identity 
Canadian citizen Individual Part of a group (class, ethnicity, 
gender, sexual orientation, or 
intersection thereof) 
Q6 Core principle 





National security (e.g. 
national surveillance to 
protect against terrorism) 
Efficiency, convenience and 
personalization (e.g. 
automatic sharing of personal 
data to increase ease of use) 
Equality and social justice (e.g. 
use of social media to ‘call-out’ 
people ostensibly guilty of 
sexual misconduct) 
Q8 
3 most serious 
problems facing 
the world 
• Competition from emerging 
economies 
• Terrorism and security 
issues 
• National debt and public 
overspending 
• Protectionism and collapse 
of free trade agreements 
• Growing income inequality 
• Systemic oppression of 
marginalized groups 
Worldview-neutral options: 
• aging populations 
• climate change 
• nuclear proliferation 
• increasing global population 
• poverty, hunger and lack of clean 
drinking water 
• spread of infectious disease 





6.3 RECRUITMENT & SAMPLE 
 
 The study drew respondents from a class of undergraduate students enrolled in the College of 
Agriculture and Bioresources at the University of Saskatchewan. The session, on March 8th 2018, began with a 
brief introduction to the study of ‘decision-making’ delivered by Dr. Peter Phillips. Immediately thereafter, the 
primary researcher (i.e. the author of this paper) briefly instructed the group of respondents to digitally access 
the survey on their computers or phones. All respondents completed the survey within the remaining duration 
of the class.  
 The population of interest was agricultural producers; undergraduate agriculture students served as a 
proxy for this population. As depicted in Table 2, the sample population contained 137 respondents, 67 of 
whom received T1, 70 of whom received T2. Assignment to T1 or T2 was digitally randomized. 
 
Group Sample Size 
T1 67 
T2 70 




 The endowment effect occurs when the condition of ownership, itself, leads the owner to overvalue an 
asset or possession (in this case, property rights in ag-data). A purely rational individual should determine a 
valuation for ag-data based on the best available evidence; endowment should play no role in their decision-
making process. Under T1, such a rational individual should choose to sell ag-data rights only for a price higher 
than his or her pre-calculated, rational valuation and, under T2, choose to acquire ag-data rights only for a price 
lower than his or her pre-calculated, rational valuation. In the context of a producer transacting ag-data, the 
relevant determinants in valuation should be (1) the value he or she can leverage from the leveraging the 
relevant ag-data and (2) the potential risks he or she can mitigate through retaining the right to exclude 
agribusinesses from secondary use. However, due to the uncertainty surrounding how ag-data could be used 
off-farm (i.e. the impacts of secondary and tertiary use), producers cannot accurately determine the true value 
of ownership and must, instead, transact largely based on irrational, biased decision making. 
 Therefore, the null hypothesis predicts a negligible difference in valuation between respondents under 
T1 from those under T2 (i.e. the pre-assignment of ownership will not influence the valuation of a perfectly 
rational actor). This thesis tests the alternative hypothesis that mean valuation of respondents under T1 will 
differ from the mean value of participants under T2 to a statistically significant degree (i.e. agricultural 
producers will value property rights in ag-data more if they enter the bargain as owners). Chapter VII explores 






 Though significant thought and attention were devoted to experimental design, it is important to note a 
few potential limitations. First, the scenario the experiment intends to convey is somewhat complex with 
respect to the precise meaning of ‘transferring ownership’ in ag-data. Specifically, the language of the 
experiment intends to convey a scenario wherein ownership pertains to a right to exclude other actors from 
using ag-data as an input off-farm use cases. Thus, T1 respondents face the choice to exchange, for monetary 
compensation, this right to exclude an agribusiness from using their ag-data in any off-farm capacity. However, 
the scenario intends to also convey that, after transferring ownership, the producer (i.e. respondent) may 
continue using this (and future) ag-data on-farm in precision agriculture activities, which is what drives the 
continuous generation of ag-data in the first instance. 
The concern is that, due either to perceived ambiguity in the experimental language or the 
sophistication of the scenario, respondents in either treatment group could arrive at differing interpretations of 
what precisely what they stand to gain or lose. This could be particularly problematic with respect to T1 if 
respondents differed in their respective interpretations of ‘transferring ownership’ over ag-data. This could 
cause the determinants of loss aversion to be stronger for some participant and weaker for others, ultimately 
producing an unreliable measurement of the endowment effect. Though considerable pre-testing of the survey 
instrument did not provide cause for such concerns, they should nevertheless be noted as potential limitations. 
A second potential limitation concerns the presentation of price options in the experiment, which 
appear in a column with ‘$0 per acre’ at the top and ‘More than $18 per acre’ at the bottom. Here, the concern 
is that, because people reliably read from top to bottom, the appearance of ‘$0’ as the first number could 
produce an anchoring effect that biases respondent valuations toward lower values. Though an anchoring effect 
is possible and the experiment could have considered alternative presentations, this concern is lessened by the 
fact that the anchoring bias would likely apply consistently across both treatment groups insofar as T2 
respondents would tend equally to read the answers from top to bottom, thereby also starting with ‘$0 per acre.’ 
Overall, neither potential limitation presents enough concern to undermine our confidence in the 





CHAPTER VII. RESULTS & ANALYSIS 
 




Figure 8 displays the sample distributions for Treatments 1 and 2. A side-by-side comparison clearly reveals 
that respondents under Treatment 1 tended toward higher valuations than respondents under Treatment 2. 
Whereas Treatment 1 features a concentration of valuations in the range of $6-15 per acre, in Treatment 2, a 
concentration consists in the range of $3-9 per acre.  
 
  
Figure 7.1: Distributions for 'Willingness to Pay' and 'Willingness to Accept'  
 
 Table 3 offers several descriptive statistics for each distribution. The first point to note is a sizable 
difference in means, with Treatment #1 (data owned by farmer) displaying a mean valuation of 11.6 ($11.6 per 
acre) versus a mean of only 7.0 ($7.0 per acre) for Treatment 2 (data owned by firm). The difference in 
medians between the two treatments was even greater, with Treatment 1 displaying a median of 12 versus a 
median of only 6 for Treatment 2. Both distributions skew positively, though Treatment 2 (1.09) skews 
considerably more than Treatment 1 (0.21). Despite these differences in mean and median, Treatments 1 and 2 
share a mode of 9. As well, each treatment displayed a similar standard deviation (4.9 for Treatment 1 and 5.0 
for Treatment 2). Finally, Treatment 1 showed thicker tails (with a kurtosis value of -0.41) while Treatment 2 
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 Treatment #1 Treatment #2 
n = 67 70 
sum 753 504 
mean 11.6 7.0 
median 12 6 
mode 9 9 
SD 4.9 5.0 
skewness 0.21 1.09 
kurtosis -0.41 1.44 
Table 7.1: Descriptive Statistics for Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 
 Finally, an Anderson–Darling test for normality determined that the populations represented by neither 
Treatment 1 nor Treatment 2 could not be assumed to be normally-distributed. Visually, this is more obvious in 
the case of Treatment 2, whereas Treatment 1 bears some visual similarities to the ‘bell curve’ of a normal 
distribution. Determining that both samples were likely nonparametric was critically important in terms of the 




 Though the difference in means between Treatments 1 and 2 was evident, an explicit test was necessary 
to confirm the statistical significance of this difference. Because the distribution of results for each treatment 
was determined to be nonparametric, comparing the two means required a nonparametric test. The Unpaired 
Two-Samples Wilcoxon Test was determined to be appropriate for comparing the means of two samples from 
populations assumed to be dependent and nonparametric. The samples were considered dependent in that they 
were drawn from the same class of students, all of whom received the same briefing information. 
 The results of the Wilcoxen test, conducted using the statistical software R, determined that the 
difference in means between Treatments 1 and 2 was highly statistically-significant, displaying a p-value of 
1.549e-06. Figure 9 provides a screenshot depicting the results of this test. 
 
 




 This study determined that an endowment effect would be recognized given a statistically significant 
difference between the means of Treatment 1 and Treatment 2. The above test verified an abundantly clear 
endowment effect, which resulted from the opposed starting positions (regarding ownership in ag-data) of each 
group. Given that the condition of ownership should have no impact on a rational actor’s valuation of ag-data, 
this result contradicts the ‘expected utility theory’ of classical economics. In a population of n=137 comprised 
entirely of ‘perfectly-rational actors,’ there would be no expected difference in mean between respondents in 
Treatments 1 and 2. Without question, a statistically-significant difference in mean on the order of 56.1% 
constitutes clear evidence for the presence of the endowment effect. This result suggests that the pre-
assignment property rights in ag-data, particularly if to producers, could impede Coasian bargaining, leading an 
inefficient (and also potentially inequitable) economic outcome.  
 




 The secondary variable of interest in this study was the mix of worldviews held by agricultural 
producers. The questions in the third survey component were designed to measure the strength of a 
respondent’s attachment to each of three worldviews (i.e. realist, liberal, critical). This was measured using a 
point system that assigned one point for each answer corresponding to a worldview. Figure 10 reveals the 
results of this measurement for respondents under Treatment 1, showing the frequency of respondents’ 
accumulated scores for each worldview.  
 Each treatment group features a comparable distribution of points toward each worldview (i.e. on 
average, all 137 respondents were comparably attached to each worldview, regardless of which treatment they 
received in second survey component). In other words, the overall distribution of attachments to each 
worldview was (more or less) consistent across the entire sample set, which would be expected in that 
respondents were drawn from the sample class of students. Further, this consistency suggests that the overall 
survey design succeeded in avoiding ordering effects. This is to say that, as intended, neither Treatment 1 nor 
Treatment 2 appear to have biased respondents under each respective condition toward a particular set of 
worldview preferences. This is very important given that the experiment intended to investigate if respondents’ 
worldviews—a set of personal characteristics understood to be independent of and prior to their decision-
making in bargains (i.e. independent variable)—impacted their valuation of ag-data ownership (i.e. dependent 











Figure 7.2: Distributions for Worldviews under Each Treatment 
 
 Table 4 provides a comparison of the mean scores for each worldview among respondents under 
Treatment 1 and Treatment 2. Under both treatments, respondents were, overall, most attached to the Realist 
worldview (µ = 3.52 for T1; µ = 3.17 for T2), but only slightly more than the Liberal worldview (µ = 3.06 for 
T1; µ = 3.21 for T2). Respondents under both treatments were considerably less attached to the Critical 
































































































Treatment 1 Treatment 2 
Realist 3.52 3.17 
Liberal 3.06 3.21 
Critical 1.96 1.81 
Table 7.3: Mean Worldview Scores For Both Treatments 
 Last, the same Anderson–Darling test for normality determined that the distributions for each 
worldview, under Treatments 1 and 2, could not be assumed to be normally distributed. Again, determining this 
was relevant to the subsequent analysis of potential relationships between respondents’ worldview scores and 




 The secondary analysis of this thesis was concerned with whether producers’ attachment to a realist, 
liberal, or critical worldview impacted the valuation of ag-data. This was measured by testing for a statistically-
significant relationship (positive or negative) between respondents’ worldview scores and the price at which 
they valued ag-data. Comparing such potential relationships among respondents under Treatment 1 with those 
under Treatment 2 presented a way to examine how the worldviews of producers might attenuate the impact of 
the endowment effect—if the strength of their attachment to any of the three worldviews might amplify or 
lessen the dynamics of loss aversion (i.e. endowment effect) determined to be present in the prior primary 
analysis. 
 Because the distributions of all relevant variables were determined to be nonparametric, this analysis 
required a correlation test appropriate for nonparametric data. The Spearman’s Rank-Order Correlation test 
(akin to a Pearson correlation but for nonparametric variables) was determined to be most appropriate given 
that—though nonparametric—the relevant variables were ordinal (all are, in fact, interval), and the relationship 
this test was interested in was monotonic but not necessarily linear. Unlike a regression, this test accounted for 
correlation but not the direction of a potential relationship between variables. Though admittedly inadequate to 
determine a potential causal (and, thus, directional) relationship between worldviews (i.e. independent variable) 
and producers’ valuation of ag-data (i.e. dependent variable), the test was sufficient to establish if and to what 
degree any potential relationships exists between the relevant variables. 
 Six tests were conducted, using R, to explore potential correlation between Variable 1, respondents’ 
valuations under both treatments, and Variable 2, their respective scores corresponding to each worldview (i.e. 
Realist, Liberal, and Critical). Table 5 displays the results of these tests. Under ‘Variable 1,’ T1($) represents 




‘Variable 2’ represents respondents’ overall scores corresponding to each respective worldview. ρ represents 
the Spearman’s correlation coefficient, which measures “the strength and direction of association between two 
ranked variables.”146 Finally, ‘p-value’ signifies the statistical significance of the correlation between the 
Variable 1 and Variable 2, while ‘sig’ represents which range of statistical significance each correlation falls 
within (* indicates a p-value < .10, ** a p-value < .5, and *** a p-value < .01). 
 
Variable 1 Variable 2 ρ p-value sig 
T1($) Realist 0.1307 0.2919  
T1($) Liberal -0.1712 0.1659  
T1($) Critical -0.1521 0.2229  
T2($) Realist -0.2268 0.0590 * 
T2($) Liberal -0.0281 0.8175  
T2($) Critical 0.2044 0.0896 * 
Table 7.4: Correlations between Worldview and Endowment Effect 
 
 As observed in Table 5, a low overall degree of statistical significance was found among the 
correlations tested. The most statistically-significant result was a negative correlation between ‘T2($)’ and 
‘Realist,’ displaying a p-value (0.0590) just shy of the standard acceptable confidence level (0.05). The second 
result with any degree of significance was a positive correlation between ‘T2($)’ and ‘Critical’ (p-value = 
0.0896). Ultimately, neither result was sufficiently sufficient to inform behavioural modelling or policy 
analysis in the subsequent chapter. 
 Though shy of the standard level of confidence necessary to reasonably assume a relationship between 
variables, the above results, nonetheless, provide some food for thought. Intriguingly, each of the two 
(somewhat) significant correlations involved T2($). One result suggests that the condition of non-ownership 
may differentially depress Realists ‘willingness to pay.’ One could extrapolate further that the endowment 
effect may be stronger among Realists; however, the corresponding correlation—though positive—between 
T1($) and Realist was not statistically significant, thus failing to demonstrate that Realists are differentially 
motivated by the framing of ‘domains of gain.’ 
 The observed negative correlation between T2($) and Critical suggests that, contrary to Realists, the 
same condition of non-ownership (a ‘domain of loss’) may have less impact on the ‘willingness to pay’ of 
Criticalists. The inverse of the Realist case, one could extrapolate that the endowment effect may be weaker 
among Criticalists; however (as in the previous case), the corresponding correlation between T1($) and 
Critica’—though negative—was not statistically significant, thus failing to demonstrate that Criticalists are 
differentially unmotivated by ‘domains of gain.’ 
                                                   




Chapter VIII. BARGAINING MODELS  
 
8.1 MODEL OVERVIEW 
 
 The results of the experiment revealed that the endowment effect may significantly impact producers’ 
valuations of property rights in ag-data. This section examines the potential implications of the endowment 
effect as an impediment to Coasian bargaining and—by extension—to an institutional configuration whereby 
producers could share in the value generated through off-farm use. Where Chapter IV advanced the 
combination of producer ownership and ag-data markets as a viable institution to realize the policy goals of 
efficiency and equity, this chapter considers whether the knowledge gained through the behavioural experiment 
(i.e. the likely presence of the endowment effect) undermines this viability. Specifically, the concern is that, if 
producers are assigned ownership to ag-data, the endowment effect may cause them to overvalue their data 
such that they demand a price (i.e. their minimal valuation) higher than what an agribusiness is willing to pay 
(i.e. their maximum valuation). In this scenario, many producers would retain exclusive ownership of much of 
the newly-generated ag-data, thereby excluding agribusinesses from using it in positive-sum use-cases that 
generate new economic value and align with the public interest. Similarly, producers withholding data could 
hinder agribusiness having a sufficient volume of data to unlock the utility of ‘big data,’ which would be 
positive in the case of secondary use, but negative in the case of tertiary use. This chapter introduces a simple 
model, incorporating a handful of assumptions and flexible parameters, to test whether the endowment effect 
could impede Coasian bargaining.  
 
8.2 MODEL PARAMETERS 
 
8.2.1 Source of Valuation for Agribusiness vs. Producer 
 
 The model features two actors: the producer and the agribusiness. Each is meant represent the 
aggregate of producers and agribusinesses, respectively. This simplification is reasonable in that the 
distribution of benefits from primary, secondary, and tertiary use, in each case, accrue consistently to the 
aggregate of producers and/or to the aggregate of agribusinesses. Under this simplified model, the relevant 
question is how each aggregate actor determines their respective valuation of ag-data before entering the 
bargain.  
 For reference, Figure 11 depicts the same institutional structure introduced as a viable policy solution 
in Chapter IV. Its underlying logic of Coasian bargaining is that, in a successful market, what determines the 
‘clearing price’ for market allocation is the value of the traded item to the actor who values it more. This should 
be the agribusiness, who can use ag-data to generate value through off-farm use in ways a producer cannot; 




the practitioners of secondary and tertiary ag-data use, are much better equipped to value ag-data in terms of its 
benefits to them; it is reasonable to assume that agribusinesses are motivated to collect and control ag-data by 
the real or prospective value it could generate for them through off-farm use-cases and, further, that they have 
likely attempted to calculate that value (i.e. the maximum price they would be willing to pay) and factor this 
calculation into their decisions in bargaining. The challenge is that the producer lacks the ability to accurately 
appraise the utility or disutility associated with ag-data ownership. 
 
















Distribution of Benefits and Costs 
Figure 8.1: Ag-Data Markets 
 How producers determine the value of ag-data is a more difficult question. At a time when much about 
the digitization of agriculture and agri-food production remains highly uncertain, producers are in a poor 
position not only to capture value off-farm but also to understand the potential outcomes of off-farm use. While 
producers may be aware of some risks attached to secondary use, they are less able to quantify those risks than 
agribusinesses (who are on the upside of secondary use and, thus, value it positively). Producers are, likewise, 
in a poor informational position to determine the value of tertiary use, leaving them less aware of its value to 
agribusinesses. Given this state of information asymmetry, the ‘starting point’ of producer valuation can have a 
major impact. 
 While this ‘starting point’ problem complicates the goal of modelling producer valuation, the 
experiment revealed a robust ‘endowment effect.’ The endowment effect is not a feature of the (uncertain) 
economic environment, but rather consists in the structure of the human mind, which behavioural economics 
shows is often susceptible to systematic errors.147 Such errors by producers are all the more likely given the 
dearth of information available to them about the risks associated with secondary ag-data use (for producers, 
withholding ag-data is worth the protection from secondary exploitation it provides) as well as the potential 
                                                   




value of ag-data to agribusinesses related to tertiary use (which producers could share in via bargaining). Thus, 
the endowment effect suggests that, regardless of the reasonable ‘starting point’ for producer valuation, 
producers are likely to value ag-data more if they own it and less if they do not. Table 6 depicts the sources of 
valuation for each actor (i.e. producer and agribusiness) tied to primary, secondary, and tertiary use, which are 
the basis by which the model operates to predict bargaining outcomes. 
 
 Agribusiness Producer 
Primary Profits from the sale of precision 
agriculture products 
Productivity/efficiency: higher 
yields/quality; lower costs 
Secondary Gaining value from producer  Avoiding value loss 
Tertiary Positive-sum off-farm use-cases  
Table 8.1: Source of Valuation for Each Actor 
 
8.2.2 Payoffs for Primary, Secondary & Tertiary Use 
 
 This model reintroduces the important concepts of Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary ag-data use. The 
model considers the marginal benefit (using an arbitrary unit) of primary, secondary, and tertiary ag-data use to 
each actor: 
• Primary use (e.g. precision agriculture) is positive-sum and generates +10 marginal benefit for the 
producer and +10 for the agribusiness. Primary use will occur regardless of whether the initial 
allocation of property rights in ag-data because it is the very process the drives ag-data generation. 
• Secondary use (e.g. commodity speculation) is zero-sum and transfers 10 marginal benefit from the 
producer to the agribusiness: +10 marginal benefit or the agribusiness and -10 for the producer. 
Commodity speculation is the most likely use-case falling into the secondary use category. Secondary 
use occurs only if agribusinesses own ag-data (either by pre-assignment or through Coasian 
bargaining). 
• Tertiary use (e.g. product innovation, etc.) is positive-sum and generates +10 marginal benefit for the 
agribusiness and at worst 0 for the producer. This category includes various use-cases whereby 
agribusiness firms generate new value without any loss to the producer (e.g. targeted marketing, 
product and end-user design, supply chain and logistics management, risk mitigation, and improved 
traceability and sustainability). As above, tertiary value occurs only if agribusinesses own ag-data. 
 
8.4 THE MODELS 
 





 Figure 12 depicts the potential outcomes of Coasian bargaining under the assumption that (1) the 
agribusiness values ag-data more than the producer and (2) no endowment effect is present. Assigning property 
rights to the agribusiness results in 30 marginal benefit for the agribusiness and 0 for the producer. This occurs 
because the producer, who values the ag-data at 10, is unwilling to pay more than 10 to acquire ownership (far 
below the minimum of 20 agribusiness would be willing to accept). On the other hand, assigning property 
rights to the producer results in 15 marginal benefit for the producer and 15 for the agribusiness. This result 
occurs because the agribusiness, who values ag-data at 20, is willing to pay the producer more than 10 to 
acquire ownership (it is assumed they strike a bargain half-way between 10 and 20: 15). This ‘15 and 15’ 
payoff is as efficient as the ‘30 and 0’ but superior in terms of equity, and is, thus, the optimal outcome. 
 
 




8.4.2 Second Model: Producer Valuation > Agribusiness Valuation 
 
 Figure 13 depicts the potential outcomes of Coasian bargaining under the assumption that the producer 
(irrationally) values ag-data more than the agribusiness and no endowment effect is present. In this case, 
assigning property rights to the agribusiness results in the worst possible outcomes for the producer (-10) but 30 
marginal benefit for the agribusiness. This is a poor outcome both in terms of efficiency because only 20 (rather 
than 30) net value is added to the economy; the outcome is poor in terms of equity because the producer is left 
with a negative marginal benefit. On the other hand, assigning property rights to the producer results in a 
marginal benefit of only 10 for the producer and 10 for the agribusiness. This outcome, which occurs because 
the producer is (irrationally) unwilling to sell property rights to the agribusiness (not even for a price of up to 
10), is equitable but inefficient. This demonstrates the negative impact (in terms of both efficiency and equity) 
resulting from overvaluation by the producer, which—though it protects the producer from secondary 
exploitation—also prevents the agribusiness from adding new value to the economy through tertiary use.  
 









8.4.3 Third Model: Endowment Effect 
 
 Figure 14 depicts virtually the same Coasian bargaining scenario as in Figure 1, but with the 
endowment effect in play. Whereas the producer had previously valued ag-data at a price lower than 20 (its 
value to the agribusiness), the endowment effect now pushes the producer’s valuation (under the condition of 
ownership) above 20. This cancels the possibility of a bargain whereby the agribusiness purchases ownership at 
a price between 10 and 20 (the cost to the agribusiness is more than offset through the value generated by a 
combination of secondary and tertiary use), effectively nullifying Coasian bargaining.  
 








 For stakeholders in the Canadian agri-food system to realize the full potential and share in the benefits 
of digital innovation, ag-data must be freely shared and transacted in a stable, predictable, and trustworthy 
environment. Fundamentally, the value of ag-data is determined by its utility—i.e. how the user can leverage it 
to capture value (or in terms of how retaining ownership could prevent value-loss). In these early days of 
technological development, producers (and potentially agribusinesses) have insufficient information to 
accurately value a property interest in ag-data. Inherently, this hinders early efforts by policymakers to assess 
the viability of ag-data markets as an efficient and equitable institutional framework for allocating rights in ag-
data.  
 As demonstrated in Chapter VIII, the results of the behavioural experiment show that agricultural 
producers will value ag-data more as owners; however, understanding this does not shed much light on where 
the range of producers’ valuations falls relative to agribusinesses. For that matter, given that most relevant use-
cases for ag-data are not yet developed or implemented, it is too soon to develop a clear sense of where 
agribusinesses value ag-data—whether now or in the future as use-cases develop and their impacts become 
better understood. Indeed, the reality is that the actual monetary value of ag-data (current and future) is likely 
unknowable at this stage. Nevertheless, for policy to take a proactive role in shaping the digitization of 
agriculture, the time is now. This chapter considers ag-data markets as an alternative to the status quo, while 
recognizing potential impediments to this institutional configuration. This final chapter offers further 
suggestion on a way forward. 
 
9.2 REVISITING THE ‘TALE OF TWO FUTURES’ 
 
 Before further discussing the opportunities and challenges surrounding ag-data markets, it bears 
recalling why the status quo is likely misaligned with the public interest. Again, the US poultry market provides 
an instructive case study for understanding the perils of over-concentrated market power and, particularly, the 
potential for data to exacerbate equity. The Meat Racket by Christopher Leonard portrays a broken food 
system, where the “95 percent of Americans [who] eat chicken” are all but forced “to support a system that 
keeps farmers in a state of indebted servitude, living like modern-day sharecroppers on the ragged edge of 
bankruptcy.”148 He argues that “[this] system extracts its costs from consumers as well” in that this oligopoly 
has “[raised] prices more and more in recent years, even as the wages of U.S. households have stagnated.”149  
                                                   





 In recent years, data appear to have played in insidious role in this process of centralization. A string of 
class-action lawsuits filed by chicken producers, food retailers, and restaurants all allege that since 2008 the 
‘big chicken’ oligopoly,150 which controls 95% of the $30-billion broiler chicken market in the U.S., have 
“engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy through use of a third-party database software called Agri Stats.”151 
Because this database allegedly collects 95% of poultry production data on 22 million chickens each day, major 
chicken processors can access production data covering nearly the entire industry. This facilitates a form of 
indirect collusion to coordinate production volumes and artificially fix the price retailers pay for poultry, 
ultimately harming both retail operators and consumers. One lawsuit noted, “The consequence of [poultry 
companies’ coordinated production] cuts in 2008 and 2011-2012 has been a nearly 50% increase in Broiler 
[chicken] wholesale prices by one measure since 2008, despite input costs (primarily corn and soybeans) falling 
roughly 20% to 23% over the same time period.”152 Together, this combination of unchecked vertical 
integration and market power, anticompetitive collusion through mass data consolidation, and the zero-sum 
‘tournament system’ by which poultry companies determine the prices paid to contract chicken producers, has 
all but obliterated “the broad-based network of small businesses that were once the backbone of rural America” 
and “[extracted] savings from the farmer without passing them on to the consumer.”153 
 This situation provides an analogue to what would be considered secondary use in the crop agriculture 
context. Though the case of US poultry is by no means predictive of ongoing trends in the digitization of crop 
agriculture, it raises relevant concerns regarding the risks of over-concentration of control over data. A recent 
think-piece from Future Agenda points out that, “[i]n a world of increasing inequality… the data ownership 
debate is polarised precisely because it is part of an already polarised political debate around… how the 
economic benefits of data collection and monetisation are distributed between the collectors and the 
collectees.”154 The vulnerability of crop producers is particularly concerning and, therefore, policy should focus 
on mitigating the potential risks from secondary use, while promoting opportunities for producers to share in 
the value created through tertiary use. If this could be achieved through policy without ‘chocking off’ 
innovation and impeding positive-sum off-farm use-cases, the value chain transformation stands to propel 
agriculture in a more utopian direction defined by greater abundance, technological progress, positive-sum 
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9.3 ARE MARKETS THE RIGHT MECHANISM? 
 
 Chapter IV determined that the institutional status quo, wherein agribusinesses collect and control all 
ag-data, is not aligned with the public interest. Specifically, the prospect of secondary use raises concern that 
agribusinesses could leverage ag-data to capture value at the expense of producers. To prevent zero-sum 
transfers of value from producers to agribusinesses (i.e. secondary use)—and provide producers with greater 
access to the positive-sum benefits of tertiary use—assigning a property interest in ag-data to producers was 
deemed the necessary precondition to institutional success. The aspiration was that property rights would allow 
for the emergence of ag-data markets whereby producers could capture a portion of the value created by off-
farm use and exercise a degree of control over the data they produced.  
 This rationale derives from classical economic theory, which holds that, given clear delineation of 
property rights and sufficiently low transaction costs, bargaining will efficiently allocate use rights to the actor 
with the capacity to generate the most economic value through their use.155 The logic of ag-data markets rests 
on the assumption that agribusinesses can generate more value from ownership than individual producers and, 
thus, would be willing to purchase use rights at a mutually-acceptable (i.e. ‘market clearing’) price. However, 
this assumes that both actors are able to accurately value ag-data in terms its respective opportunities and risks. 
Agribusinesses are far better equipped to value ag-data than producers, first, because they have access to it in 
aggregate and, second, because they have the greater knowledge, resources, and capacity. Thus, significant 
danger looms in the possibility that, due to behavioural dynamics, producers may enter the bargain overly 
valuing ag-data relative to agribusinesses , forestalling efficient market exchange. The outcome of this 
configuration would be equitable, in that producers would use their ownership rights to circumvent potential 
losses from secondary use; however, the concomitant drawback comes in terms of efficiency—the market 
would fail to efficiently allocate rights in ag-data, with the attendant opportunity cost of foregone positive sum 
tertiary uses.  
 As explored in the ‘Third Model’ in Chapter VIII, the endowment effect significantly increases the 
likelihood that any producer’s valuation will be higher than that of an agribusiness, thereby precluding 
“mutually acceptable trades.”156 Moreover, this likelihood only increases as off-farm use-cases develop: though 
many producers may currently care little about if or how an agribusiness leverages their data, in time, their 
valuation of ag-data will likely increase considerably in proportion to their growing awareness of the risks (i.e. 
secondary exploitation) and opportunities (i.e. capturing ‘their’ share of tertiary value) associated with 
ownership. Adding to this dynamic, the endowment effect itself may become more pronounced when higher 
stakes are attached to ownership. Experts have suggested “that the [agribusiness] sees no value in a single 
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farm’s data” to the extent that its impact on a large, aggregated dataset is negligible.157 Functioning together, 
these dynamics present a significant risk of undermining the intended function of ag-data markets, negating not 
only the drawbacks, but also value of off-farm ag-data use. This strongly suggests that policymakers may need 
to consider alternatives beyond simple markets. 
 
9.4 POTENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIONS 
 
 This section turns immediately to the question of which alternative institutional configurations could 
help overcome the deficiencies of simple ag-data markets. The crux of the issue is that assigning a property 
interest in ag-data to producers (for exchange), if simple markets are the venue for exchange, may fail to 
accomplish policy goals with respect to both efficiency and equity. The rational actor assumptions of classical 
economics likely do not hold in an environment where use-cases for ag-data have yet to develop and large 
asymmetries in information, capacity, and bargaining power exist between producers and agribusinesses. In 
lieu of more complete information about the opportunities and risks they face, producers default to less rational 
modes of decision-making. To address this issue, three additional institutional features have been identified to 
create the conditions necessary to circumvent secondary use as well as facilitate tertiary use and distribute its 
benefits among producers and agribusinesses. 
It is worth noting that the potential value producers could obtain through selling their ag-data is 
significant. For example, even increasing a producer’s profit per acre by an average of $10 on a 50,000-acre 
operation adds $500,000 to overall farm receipts. Given the increasing scale of today’s farms, there is a clear 
economic case for ag-data as an additional revenue stream for producers. Provided the right institutional 
configuration, in theory producers stand to capture a significant portion of the considerable value generated 
through eventual off-farm use cases, a gain that could potentially exceed $10 per acre. To this end, the 
following institutional features provide a few potential pathways to a more equitable distribution of the value 




 Information asymmetry drastically limits the ability of producers to accurately value ag-data in terms 
of its opportunities and risks. Bargaining from a position of ownership, producers would have control over their 
ag-data but still lack the information to judge when it is worth relinquishing control for monetary 
compensation. Producers would be less likely to overvalue ag-data rights (and might engage more efficiently in 
bargaining) had they the capacity to assess the relative magnitude of opportunities and risks associated with ag-
data ownership.  
                                                   




 The ‘transparency issue’ has received considerable attention in a range of ag-data proposals and 
initiatives. While these efforts have certainly improved the degree of transparency demanded by more 
producers and guaranteed by agribusinesses, there is a long way yet to go. Most ag-data contracts today—
whether in the U.S., Australia, or Canada—lack any provisions that, first, recognize a property interest in ag-
data for producers and, second, require agribusinesses to reveal how they will use ag-data off-farm (i.e. 
transparency).  
 In 2014, the American Farm Bureau established the Privacy and Security Principles for Farm Data Ag 
Data (The Principles), setting out 13 broad principles 158 to inform contractual agreements between 
agribusinesses and producers regarding ag-data use. One among the 13, Transparency and Consistency 
connotes that: 
“ATPs shall notify farmers about the purposes for which they collect and use farm data. They should 
provide information about how farmers can contact the ATP with any inquiries or complaints, the types 
of third parties to which they disclose the data and the choices the ATP offers for limiting its use and 
disclosure. An ATP’s principles, policies and practices should be transparent and fully consistent with 
the terms and conditions in their legal contracts. An ATP will not change the customer’s contract 
without his or her agreement.” 
 
To further advance the adoption of the 13 principles by agribusinesses, a non-profit called the Ag Data 
Transparency Evaluator (ADTE) formed in 2018 to create the governing body responsible for administering the 
AgData Transparent Seal (the Seal), “a designation that demonstrates to customers and others that they are 
transparent in how they collect, use, store and analyze farmers’ data.”159 Several notable agribusinesses160 have 
received the Seal, John Deere being the first major player161 and FCC the first Canadian company.”162 To 
obtain the Seal, an agribusiness must complete a questionnaire detailing their ag-data practices and provide 
sufficient evidence that: contracts with users clearly delineate ownership in ag-data to producers, off-farm use 
occurs only with the express consent of producers, and that complete transparency is maintained regarding the 
nature and outcomes of any off-farm ag-data activities. 
 The current list of signatories signals a positive trend in terms of greater control over ag-data on the 
part of producers; however, thought leaders in the ag-data space (including Todd Janzen, a central architect of 
the ADTE) have voiced concern that the status quo is not shifting fast enough: “ag tech providers still do not 
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get it—ag data is not just 1s and 0s, but proprietary information that should be grounded in an ownership 
principle.”163 Indeed, the reality is that most agribusinesses have yet to embrace some or any of the 13 
principles in their contractual arrangements with producers. While it is not clear that convincing agribusinesses 
to agree, on voluntarily basis, to provide transparency for their customers will enable effective ag-data markets, 
the ADTE have certainly made some headway (particularly given the involvement of a major player in John 
Deere) and the Seal has likely been (and will likely continue to be) a critical tool for educating producers about 
ag-data ownership and the opportunities and risk associated with off-farm ag-data use. 
 
9.4.2 Data Licensing 
 
 De Beer notes that “the most basic element of property ownership is the exclusive right to control the 
terms and conditions of access to a resource.”164 In many ways, excludability is the most fundamental right 
attached to ownership in that it empowers the owner to preclude others from using the item in which property 
rights are held. In the agriculture and agri-food context, ownership in ag-data would empower producers to 
circumvent the risks of secondary use while ensuring that tertiary use occurs only with their permission and 
that they are able to share in the new value generated.  
 Before accounting for the impact of the endowment effect and other behavioural dynamics, simple ag-
data markets were considered as a potential institutional path toward these benefits. However, too narrow a 
definition of excludability may limit the effectiveness of property rights as an institutional mechanism. Simple 
ag-data markets are likely too rigid—treating ownership as a strict binary and the act of transferring ownership 
as unidirectional, total, and permanent may be a problem. 
 Data licensing offers an alternative to the outright ‘sale’ of ag-data. It would allow producers to permit 
an agribusiness to use a particular dataset, in the context of a particular use-case, for a particular period. 
Inasmuch as the ‘domain of loss’ framing would have less impact on a producer’s decision to license versus to 
sell, the endowment effect is likely far less present (if it exists at all) in a producer’s decision of whether to 
license. If so, producers could simply license their ag-data (which would remain theirs) to agribusinesses for 
particular use-cases rather than face the decision to permanently bargain away ownership. Another major 
advantage lies in that fact that agribusinesses would need to specify, as a necessary step of negotiating any 
licensing agreement, the particular use-case(s) to which the license would apply, thereby helping to alleviate 
many of the transparency concerns discussed above. Finally, data licensing could provide a source of recurring 
income for producers, whereas, under a simple ag-data market, producers would be able to sell each set of 
particular data only once. 
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9.4.3 Data Co-ops & ‘Datatrusts’ 
 
 The volume of data produced on an individual farm is infinitesimally small relative to the troves of 
aggregated ag-data controlled by ATPs. This concentration of ag-data and market power is problematic for 
several reasons, two of which apply specifically to ag-data exchange. As noted, overconcentration of ag-data 
could undermine the efficiency of simple markets in that the position of agribusinesses may leave them 
unwilling to pay the minimum sum demanded by producers for ag-data from their individual farm. Ellixson and 
Griffin note that “farmers have no bargaining power once the data system [reaches] a critical mass of 
farms/acreage” 165 because “data is worth more when there is more of it.” 166 This not only contributes to the 
likelihood of producers valuing ag-data more than agribusinesses (i.e. inefficient), but also lowers the benefit 
producers would receive from transacting in ag-data markets (i.e. inequitable). 
 One institutional measure that could address these problems is the establishment of data co-operatives 
(co-ops), whereby “a group of farmers may have a better chance at recovery considering their collective data 
has more value” 167 than that of an individual producer in the same negotiation. Co-ops could create 
countervailing market power that could advance the policy objectives of efficiency and equity, particularly in 
conjunction with the use of data licensing agreements. The policy window to support and encourage such 
developments may narrow with greater consolidation, but for now is fairly wide open in that the field of ATPs 
remains competitive and varied.168 Greater consolidation among ATPs would increase the volume of ag-data 
that producer co-ops would need to aggregate to exert market power. Therefore, the sooner producers 
coordinate in such ways to improve their market position vis-à-vis data, the better. 
 A handful of initiatives are underway to consolidate producer-owned ag-data for a variety of purposes 
other than those proposed above (i.e. increasing their value when monetized). These initiatives align with the 
concept of a ‘datatrust,’ which “establishes a technology framework that enables the control and sovereignty of 
data assets between trusted data partners.”169 One such group is the Agricultural Data Coalition (ADC),170 with 
the stated mission “to create a neutral, independent, farmer-centric data repository where farmers can securely 
store and control the information collected by technology tools.”171 A similar initiative is the Global Open Data 
for Agriculture and Nutrition (GODAN), which is mandated to make “agricultural and nutritional data 
available, accessible, and usable for unrestricted use worldwide.”172 These initiatives, and others, could help 
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build a new set of producer-led entitles with the express purpose of aggregating ag-data to increase its 
monetized value through sale or licensing agreements. The result should be accelerated innovation, more 





 Each of the three aforementioned policy measures addresses a particular defect one could reasonably 
foresee impeding the success of simple ag-data markets. However, the positive impacts of each policy measure 
would work to reinforce one another. An institutional framework that (1) required contracts between 
agribusinesses and producers to adhere to the ADTE’s 13 principles (particularly Transparency and 
Consistency), (2) enabled producers to license (instead of sell) ag-data in a transparent and trustworthy 
environment, and (3) featured producer-controlled data institutions (co-ops and/or datatrusts), could meet all 
the necessary conditions for an ag-data market that provides a sufficient degree of control for producers while 
still allocating ag-data toward the most productive use-cases. It falls beyond the scope of this thesis to specify 
how, under Canadian law, to legislate or govern such an institutional framework into existence. Rather, this 
thesis first considered the behavioural dynamics potentially threatening the efficiency of simple ag-data 
markets, then offered—in broad strokes—three very general institutional mechanisms that could, together, 
circumvent these behavioural dynamics. Such an institutional configuration would—as set out as broad policy 
objectives in Chapter I—support innovation and efficiency, promote greater trust and predictability, and 
allocate property rights such that ag-data permeates existing industrial systems in ways that generate positive-
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APPENDIX A. CONSENT FORM 
 
Graeme Jobe 
Master of Public Policy Candidate, Johnson Shoyama Graduate School of Public Policy 




We are interested in learning about your perceptions and responses toward data, risks and opportunities. These 
responses will help researchers at the University of Saskatchewan to gain insight into the market interactions 
between farmers and large agribusiness firms. We invite you to share your responses! 
This 30-minute survey, funded by SSHRC, is hosted by Voxco, a Canadian-owned and managed company 
whose data is securely stored in Canada. 
This research project has been approved on ethical grounds by the University of Saskatchewan Research Ethics 
Board, and has indicated that there are no foreseeable risks. Any questions regarding your rights as a participant 
may be addressed to that committee through the Research Ethics Office ethics.office@usask.ca; (306) 966-
2975. Out of town participants may call toll free (888) 966-2975.  
In order to complete this survey, you may be required to answer certain questions; however, you are never 
obligated to respond and you may withdraw from the survey at any time by closing your internet browser and 
notifying the research administrator. Participation is strictly voluntary. 
By selecting next and completing this questionnaire, your free and informed consent is implied and indicates 
that you understand the above conditions to participate in this study. 
Please consider printing this page for your records. 
 
APPENDIX B: DEBRIEFING MESSAGE 
 
Thank you for your participation in this survey. The purpose of this survey was to determine whether farmers 
are likely to place a higher value on data rights if they already have ownership. In other words, will farmers pay 
less to acquire ownership than what they would accept to sell these rights? This is what is referred to in 
behavioural economics as the ‘endowment effect.’ Our prediction is that the endowment effect will be present 
in farmers’ valuation of data ownership rights. Your participation helps us to learn and understand how farmers 
interact with agribusiness firms, which provides tremendous insight into how digital technology will impact the 
agriculture sector—both in Canada and abroad. 
If you have any questions about the survey or would like to receive a summary of the research results, please 
contact Graeme Jobe (gjj397@mail.usask.ca), Graduate Student or Dr. Peter Phillips (peter.phillips@usask.ca), 
Supervisor at the University of Saskatchewan. 
We sincerely thank you for your time and your help! 
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